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What doesn’t kill you will only make you more risk-loving: 
Early-life disasters and CEO behavior 
Gennaro Bernile, Vineet Bhagwat, and P. Raghavendra Rau* 
The Journal of Finance, forthcoming 
ABSTRACT 
The literature on managerial style posits a linear relation between a CEO’s past experiences and 
firm risk. We show that there is a non-monotonic relation between the intensity of CEOs’ early-
life exposure to fatal disasters and corporate risk-taking. CEOs who experience fatal disasters 
without extremely negative consequences lead firms that behave more aggressively, whereas 
CEOs who witness the extreme downside of disasters behave more conservatively. These patterns 
manifest across various corporate policies including leverage, cash holdings, and acquisition 
activity. Ultimately, the link between CEOs’ disaster experience and corporate policies has real 
economic consequences on firm riskiness and cost of capital. 
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“I know of no one who has achieved something significant without also in their own 
lives experiencing their share of hardship, frustration, and regret…if you're like me and 
you occasionally want to swing for the fences, you can't count on a predictable life.”  
Tim Cook, CEO of Apple Inc., Auburn University Spring 2010 Commencement 
 
Chief executive officers’ (CEO) managerial styles explain a large fraction of the variation in firm 
capital structure, investment, compensation, and disclosure policies (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003), Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2010), Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012)). Moreover, the evidence 
indicates that at least part of the heterogeneity in CEOs’ managerial styles reflects the variation 
in individual life and career experiences (e.g., Graham and Narasimhan (2005), Malmendier and 
Tate (2005), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011), Benmelech and Frydman (2014), Lin, Ma, 
Officer, and Zou (2014), Schoar and Zuo (2013), Dittmar and Duchin (2015)). 
A common thread underlying this line of research is the existence of a monotonic relation 
between treatment and effect. Specifically, existing studies indicate that exposure to a particular 
macroeconomic, personal, or career-specific event has a unidirectional effect on risk-taking by 
the CEO and consequently on corporate policies. In this study, we test whether the intensity of 
early-life experiences has a non-monotonic impact on CEOs’ attitudes toward risk and thus on 
the corporate policies that they influence. In medical terms, this is the possibility that the strength 
of the dosage, in addition to whether a treatment is administered, also affects the outcome of the 
treatment. This hypothesis, relatively unexamined in the finance and economics literature, is a 
standard prediction in the psychiatry literature (e.g., Yerkes and Dodson (1908)).  
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Early-life exposure to the consequences of environmental risk may affect a CEO’s risk-
taking in several ways. CEOs with exposure to fatalities from natural disasters may be more 
sensitized to the consequences of risk, and therefore be wary of decisions that increase firm risk. 
However, it is also plausible that childhood exposure to natural disasters may give the CEOs 
experience in dealing with risky situations and increase their confidence when making decisions 
involving firm risk. Hence, the effect of exposure to natural disasters on subsequent behavior 
may be non-monotonic, as Castillo and Carter (2011) find with respect to trust and reciprocity 
between individuals. CEOs with disaster experience that is not significantly fatal would develop 
a higher risk tolerance, whereas those with exposure to major fatal disasters would be sensitized 
to the negative consequences of risk and therefore tend to behave more conservatively.1 
To test this conjecture, we examine the relation between CEO early-life exposure to fatal 
disasters and subsequent corporate financial and investment policies adopted by the firms that 
employ the CEOs. Specifically, we identify the name, date, and place of birth of 1,508 U.S.-born 
CEOs in a sample of S&P1500 firms from 1992 to 2012. We also assemble a unique database of 
U.S. county-level natural disaster events over the period 1900–2010, including earthquakes, 
volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, hurricanes, tornadoes, severe storms, floods, landslides, and 
wildfires. Then we combine the two databases to infer the CEOs’ likely exposure to the 
consequences of natural disasters during their formative years, that is age 5 to 15 (Nelson 
(1993)). 
In our baseline tests, we group CEOs based on the number of disaster-related fatalities scaled 
by the birth-county population during the formative years of their childhood. We then examine 
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the relation between CEO early-life disaster experience and several firm decisions and outcomes 
pertaining to capital structure, acquisition activity, and return volatility.  
Our results provide a consistent picture across the firm decisions and outcomes on which 
CEOs typically have a large influence (e.g., Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2012, 2013)). 
Specifically, we find a robust inverse U-shaped relation between a CEO’s early-life exposure to 
fatal disasters and corporate risk taking. For example, all else equal, firms whose CEOs 
experienced a moderate level of fatalities from disasters have a 3.4% higher leverage ratio than 
firms whose CEOs experienced no fatal disasters, a magnitude comparable to the depression 
babies effect documented in Malmendier and Nagel (2011). In contrast, firms whose CEOs 
experienced extreme levels of fatalities from disasters have a 3.7% lower leverage ratio than 
firms whose CEOs have no fatal disaster experience (and hence an overall 7.1% lower leverage 
ratio than firms whose CEOs have a moderate level of fatal disaster experience). These results 
are due to active financing choices made by the CEOs. Specifically, CEOs with moderate levels 
of fatal disaster experience are significantly more likely to fill their net financing deficit with 
debt rather than equity, pay higher interest expenses and loan spreads on their debt, and their 
debt is likely to be rated lower than CEOs with no fatal disaster experience. Their firms are also 
significantly more likely to go through bankruptcy. In contrast, CEOs with extreme levels of 
fatal disaster experience display diametrically opposite patterns. 
Similarly, CEOs with moderate (extreme) levels of fatal disaster experience hold 
significantly less (more) cash, announce more (fewer) acquisitions, are less (more) likely to pay 
for acquisitions with stock, and are more (less) likely to announce unrelated acquisitions than 
- 4 - 
 
CEOs with no fatal disaster experience. Consistent with excessive risk taking, acquisitions by 
CEOs with moderate fatal disaster experience earn worse announcement returns. Firms managed 
by moderate disaster CEOs also display higher volatility, especially idiosyncratic volatility, than 
CEOs with no disaster experience, while again CEOs with extreme disaster experience display 
opposite patterns. 
Overall, our results support the notion that experiencing fatal disasters without extreme 
consequences desensitizes CEOs to the negative consequences of risk. In contrast, CEOs who 
experienced extreme fatal disasters and witnessed the downside potential of risky situations 
appear to be more cautious in approaching risk when at the helm of a firm.  
All our empirical specifications include time, state of birth, year of birth, and firm fixed 
effects, which effectively purge cohort effects from our analysis. Moreover, all our tests control 
for the historical incidence of disaster-related fatalities in the CEO’s county of birth, over the 
period 1900-2010, allowing us to differentiate the effect of a CEO growing up in a “high-risk” 
county versus actually living through fatal disasters during the formative years. For example, a 
CEO who did not experience any major fatalities despite growing up in the “tornado belt” (states 
like Kansas, for example), may underestimate the expected costs of tornadoes (and by extension, 
other risky events).2 For the same reason, we conduct a difference-in-difference analysis on 
CEOs that experienced major fatal disasters relative to CEOs who did not experience a major 
disaster and were within the age of 5 to 15 years old in unaffected neighboring counties (within 
100 miles from the disaster), and find results consistent with our baseline evidence. 
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A potential concern with our empirical method is that we do not directly observe a CEO’s 
disaster experience, but infer it based on the CEO’s county and year of birth. It is possible that 
the CEO did not actually live in the county of birth for fifteen years after birth. We address this 
concern in three ways. First, we verify that our results are robust to using alternative windows to 
measure a CEO’s early life experiences, for example, years 5-10 after birth. Second, we show 
that our results are robust to restricting our sample to CEOs for whom we can verify that the 
county of birth is in the state where they also received their Social Security number – typically in 
their teenage years according to Yonker (2012).3 Third, we conduct a placebo test where we 
assign a random birth county to each CEO and find no statistically significant effects of the 
correspondingly random disaster experience on our outcome variables. Overall, our robustness 
tests indicate that even though we may not directly measure each CEO’s disaster experience, 
whatever measurement error exists is most likely random noise. 
Finally, we conduct a difference-in-difference analysis on a small set of exogenously timed 
CEO turnover events available in our sample where the risk tolerances of the incoming and old 
CEOs are different. We find that changes in corporate policies around these turnover events 
reflect the differences in risk-tolerances of the new and old CEOs as measured by our childhood 
disaster experience proxy. This evidence suggests that CEOs’ risk preferences may have a causal 
impact on corporate policies or, at the very least, are a determining factor in CEO hiring 
decisions by boards that aim for swift changes in their firms’ risk profiles. 
Our analysis contributes to the literature that examines how managerial styles relate to 
CEOs’ life experiences such as marital status (Roussanov and Savor (2013)), holding a pilot 
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license (Cain and McKeon (2014)), political affiliation (Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar (2014)), 
military experience (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011)), and past career experiences (Schoar 
and Zuo (2013)). To various degrees, the experiences analyzed in these studies are endogenous, 
which makes drawing a causal link with respect to CEOs’ risk preferences a challenge. An 
appealing feature of our setting is that early-life exposure to fatal disasters provides a sensible 
exogenous source of variation in an individual’s life. In this sense, an important contribution of 
our analysis is that it identifies an exogenous primitive in an individual’s life that determines 
rather than manifests his or her attitude toward risk.  
Since we infer CEO early-life experiences based on date and county of birth, our approach is 
more similar to the cohort-based studies that examine the effect of early-life experiences, for 
example, having lived through the U.S. Great Depression (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011)). 
However, one important advantage in our setting is that we are able exploit within-cohort 
heterogeneity to purge our tests of cohort effects and bolster the identification of early-life 
experiences on corporate outcomes. In addition, given the nature of our measure, we are able to 
examine how the intensity of early-life experiences affects subsequent risk-taking behavior and 
show for the first time that exogenous non-economic events shape CEOs’ attitudes toward 
economic risk. 
It is noteworthy that CEOs in our sample have roughly the same likelihood of experiencing 
fatal disasters in childhood as a typical member of the US population. Thus, the likelihood of 
becoming a CEO seems to be independent from fatal disaster experience, which suggests that our 
results may have broader implications beyond CEOs’ risk taking. In that regard, our results may 
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be important for research on the effects of life experiences on capital market participants’ 
behavior (e.g., Knüpfer, Rantapuska, and Sarvimäki, 2014; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2013; 
Kim and Lee, 2014). Existing studies focus on the linear relation between risk exposure and 
investor behavior. Our results suggest that examining non-monotonic effects of risk exposure 
could be fruitful in the context of investor behavior. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I motivates our hypotheses. Section II 
describes the data. Section III discusses our main results and Section IV presents the results of 
various robustness tests. Section V concludes. 
I. Motivation 
Managers’ ability to assess and cope with risk has pervasive effects on corporate decision-
making (Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007)) and CEOs are arguably among the most 
influential corporate decision-makers (Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2012, 2013)). Indeed, CEO 
fixed effects explain variation in corporate policies that traditional firm-level determinants 
cannot explain (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2010), Graham, Li, 
and Qiu (2011)) and there is a growing consensus that CEOs’ past experiences in life account for 
the differences in corporate risk taking (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Graham and 
Narasimhan (2004), Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2010), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011), 
Schoar and Zuo (2013), Dittmar and Duchin (2015)).4 A unifying thread in this literature is the 
notion that exposure to a particular life experience has a unidirectional effect on a CEO’s risk-
taking propensity and hence on corporate policies. 
- 8 - 
 
In the psychology literature, however, Yerkes and Dodson (1908) posit a non-monotonic 
relation between arousal and performance: performance would increase with arousal up to a 
point and decrease when levels of arousal are too high. In various contexts, the empirical 
evidence is consistent with such nonlinear relation between stress and performance (e.g., 
Hammarberg and Silver (1994), Kleim and Ehlers (2009), Colville and Cream (2009)). 
Importantly for our purposes, traumatic experiences predict high stress levels long after the 
events (Holman and Silver (1998)) and, among these, exposure to natural disasters has large and 
lasting effects on individuals (Elder (1999)). Moreover, there is evidence that natural disaster 
exposure affects short run financial decision-making of both individuals (e.g., Cameron and 
Shah (2013), Cassar, Healy, and von Kessler (2011)) and firms (e.g., Ramirez and Altay (2011), 
Dessaint and Matray (2013)). In fact, Bucciol and Zarri (2013) find that natural disaster 
experiences have long-lasting effects on investor portfolio decisions.  
Recent medical research suggests a possible mechanism underlying these patterns. First, 
neuroscience and epigenetics studies indicate that adverse experiences affect subsequent 
behavior at least partly due to permanent physiological and biological changes in the brain (e.g., 
Lyoo et al. (2011), Labonté et al. (2012), Mehta et al. (2013)). Second, evolutionary biologists 
argue that biological systems with an original function commonly adapt to different functions, a 
phenomenon known as ‘co-option’ (Futuyma (1998)). Hence, if brain development and function 
are physiologically altered by trauma, it is plausible that the brain functions affected by non-
economic risk may be subsequently co-opted to deal with economic risk.5 It seems thus 
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reasonable that early-life experiences of fatal disasters could have long-term effects on an 
individual’s psyche, neurobiology, and economic decision-making.6 
II. Data description 
A. CEOs’ birth dates and places 
We collect names of CEOs from Compustat’s Execucomp database, which covers firms in 
the S&P1500 from 1992 to 2012. We retrieve CEO biographical data from Marquis Who’s Who, 
Standard and Poor’s Register of Directors and Executives, and US Executive Compensation 
database on Lexis-Nexis, NNDB.com, or via Google searches in the last instance. We are able to 
obtain reliable place and date of birth information for 2,102 CEOs of the 6,804 CEOs in the 
initial database. After excluding foreign-born CEOs, those where we cannot determine the 
county of birth, and those with missing firm-level data, we are left with a sample of 1,508 U.S.-
born CEOs of firms in the S&P1500 from 1992 to 2012. Over this period, the sample CEOs span 
8,533 firm-year observations for which we are able to obtain the data required to conduct the 
baseline tests pertaining to firms’ capital structure, acquisitiveness, and stock volatility. 
B. U.S. County-level Natural Disasters 
The set of natural disaster events that we use comprises earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, 
tsunamis, hurricanes, tornadoes, severe storms, floods, landslides, and fires. For each event, we 
collect county-level data on the date of the event, the reported number of injuries and fatalities, 
and the estimated dollar losses related to crop and property damage in 2009 dollars.  
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Our database of U.S. county-level natural disaster events spans the period from 1900 to 2010. 
To construct the natural disaster database, we begin by retrieving all available records from the 
United States Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database (SHELDUS™) of the University of 
South Carolina for the period from 1960 to 2010.7 This is a county-level dataset that includes the 
beginning date, U.S. county location, property losses, crop losses, injuries, and fatalities 
associated with various natural hazard event types. However, because a majority of CEOs in our 
sample are born prior to 1960, we use available historical records to construct a county-disaster 
event database equivalent to SHELDUS™ that spans the period from 1900 to 1959. Details of 
our data sources are provided in the Appendix. 
Panel A of Table I provides summary statistics of the natural disasters in our sample. Most 
events in our sample are weather-related (e.g., floods, thunderstorms, hail, etc.) and tend to be 
inconsequential in terms of human injuries and fatalities as well as of the resulting economic 
damages. In contrast, the least frequent events such as earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes tend to 
have the direst consequences, both in terms of fatalities and economic damages.8 
[Insert TABLE I here] 
C. CEO Early-life Disaster Experience 
We measure early-life disaster experience based on the severity of the disasters in the CEO’s 
county of birth starting 5 years and ending 15 years after the CEO’s birth year. We focus on this 
period because medical research shows that the formation of lasting childhood memories tends to 
start around the 5th birthday, while the 15th birthday is a natural stopping time for “early 
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childhood” memories (Nelson (1993)). The results are robust to using alternative windows to 
calculate our measure, for example, [t+5, t+10]. 
Starting from the county-disaster event database, for each county-year, we calculate the total 
number of all fatalities from natural disasters and divide it by the population of that county in 
that year. Then, we calculate the mean of this variable for each CEO-county over the relevant 10 
year period after birth. 
Our main measure of a given CEO’s disaster experience is a categorical variable that groups 
CEOs into three categories based on the 10-year disaster-related average fatality measure. Those 
who experience no fatal disasters in their county of birth during the relevant years are in the No 
Fatality group. CEOs in the top decile of the distribution of our measure are in the Extreme 
Fatality group, while all the others are in the Medium Fatality group. 
We also employ several other measures of early-life disaster experience to ensure our results 
are not dependent on one particular metric. We alternatively measure disaster experience using 
inflation-adjusted economic damages (crop and property damage) in the birth county over the 
relevant 10-year period. In addition, instead of defining Extreme Fatality as the top 10% of the 
fatality experience distribution, we alternatively define it as the top 15% or the top 5% of the 
distribution in later tests. Lastly, we employ a continuous measure of fatalities per capita from 
natural disasters instead of indicators for the three categories based on this measure. Our results 
are consistent across all these alternative measures, as discussed in Section IV.  
Panel C of Table I reports the top ten birth-states of CEOs in our sample and the distribution 
of disaster experience of CEOs from those states. The modal birth state is New York, accounting 
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for 251 CEOs in our sample. Of these, 27.49% did not experience any fatal disasters between the 
ages of 5 and 15 in their birth county, 11.16% experienced extreme levels of fatal disasters, 
while the remaining 61.35% fall in the Medium Fatality group. Although the distribution of CEO 
birth states is not uniform, there is considerable variation in the disaster experiences of CEOs 
from the same birth state. 
In Table II, we compare our sample CEOs’ disaster experience to the U.S. population. Using 
the historical annual population and disaster experience of each county, in a given year, 21.09% 
of the population experienced at least one disaster in our database, 10.7% experienced a fatal 
disaster, 1.2% a disaster with major fatalities, and 1.1% experienced a disaster with major 
economic damages.9 Compared to a typical ten year period, our sample CEOs are just as likely to 
experience a fatal disaster during the relevant ten years of their childhood as the US population 
(66.80% versus 67.86%), a disaster with major fatalities (11.73% versus 10.22%), and a disaster 
with major economic damages (10.56% versus 10.87%).  
[Insert TABLE II here] 
That CEOs in our sample are roughly as likely to experience disasters that are fatal or have 
major consequences as a typical member of the U.S. population is potentially important. In 
particular, if disaster experience does not materially affect the likelihood of becoming a CEO, 
our inferences about the effects of early-life fatal disaster experience on risk taking may apply 
beyond the narrow context of individuals who later become CEOs of publicly traded firms. A 
natural research question here is why would disaster experiences manifest themselves when 
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choosing policies like corporate leverage, but not careers? However, while risk preferences may 
indeed affect career choices, becoming a CEO is not quite a choice variable. Therefore, although 
disaster experiences may well affect career choices, investigating this link appears to be beyond 
the scope of this paper given that our analysis is in-sample (i.e., focusing on a sample of 
executives that do in fact become CEOs). 
D. Firm Characteristics 
Table III reports summary statistics of the main firm characteristics used in our analysis. The 
first two columns report the mean and standard deviation of those characteristics for the entire 
sample of firm-years, while the remaining columns report similar statistics for the subsamples 
segmented by CEO disaster experience. We do not discuss these statistics here because, as noted 
below, the lack of controls for cohort effects leaves us unable to draw meaningful comparisons 
from these statistics.  
[Insert TABLE III here] 
Since we are not able to locate the birthplace for all CEOs in Execucomp, we also assess the 
differences between CEOs and firms in our sample versus those in the Execucomp and 
Compustat universes (not tabulated for brevity in the main paper).10 Compared to the typical 
Compustat firm, the average firm in our sample is significantly larger – about seven times larger; 
has more fixed assets; uses more financial leverage; holds less cash; is more likely to pay 
dividends; and has lower stock return volatility. The differences between the two samples are not 
surprising given that CEOs of larger, more prominent firms are more likely to have public 
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sources documenting their biography and birth place. We thus acknowledge an inherent bias in 
our data collection leading to some CEOs being omitted, and do not take a formal stance on how 
generalizable our results may be to other CEOs that are not in the sample. However, we see no 
obvious reason why these differences should imply that our inferences regarding the effects of 
CEO’s early-life exposure to natural disasters would be biased within the sample that we can 
obtain.  
III. Main Results 
In this section, we examine the relation between CEO attitude toward risk, as captured by 
early-life natural disaster experiences, and various firm decisions and outcomes pertaining to 
firm capital structure, acquisitiveness, and stock volatility. Various papers in this area focus on 
cohort effects, most prominently the cohort affected early in life by the Great Depression (e.g., 
Malmendier and Nagel (2011), Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011)). 
In contrast, our approach is not specific to a single cohort. In particular, in all our empirical 
models, we include firm, year, and CEO birth year and state of birth fixed effects. Including all 
four types of fixed effects enables us to effectively wash out all cohort effects. To illustrate why 
it is important to purge cohort effects, consider an example. At a particular point in time, a CEO 
growing up in Florida may experience a major hurricane while another CEO of the same age 
growing up in California does not. But states may also differ on a cultural basis. People born in 
Florida may be culturally more or less risk averse on average than people born in other states and 
we would not want these differences to contaminate our estimates. Similarly, a CEO who 
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experienced Hurricane Andrew in Florida might not be comparable to a CEO born 10 years 
earlier in Florida. Within a state, as populations ebb and flow and economic conditions change, 
time-varying differences in state-level characteristics have the potential to affect our inferences. 
Hence, by controlling for all four types of fixed effects, our tests only exploit within-cohort 
heterogeneity across CEOs. It is worth noting, however, that our results are robust to excluding 
one or more of these fixed effects. 
To absorb the effect of certain counties being more disaster prone, all tests also control for 
the non-linear effect of the expected disaster fatality rate in the CEOs’ birth counties during the 
period from 1900 to 2010. As a result, a CEO’s residual disaster experience during a particular 
ten year period should be effectively random.11  
Since we model the effect of CEO disaster experience using a nonlinear specification, we 
also allow for the relation between each dependent variable and the birth county average fatality 
rate to be non-linear by including its square in all baseline specifications. In a similar spirit, in 
alternative specifications, we augment the baseline model specifications to ensure that our 
treatment effects are not capturing unmodeled nonlinearities between the dependent variables 
and any other control variable. 
The standard set of controls across all tests includes: natural log of book assets, market-to-
book ratio, asset tangibility (fixed assets/book assets), dividend paying indicator, ROA, sales 
growth, CEO age and age squared, and CEO female indicator. 
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A. CEO Early-life Disaster Experience and Corporate Financial Policies 
Table IV reports the estimates from OLS regressions where the dependent variables are the 
year-end book financial leverage (Columns 1-3) and cash-to-asset ratio (Column 4-6) of the 
firms in the sample. Across policies and model specifications, the evidence consistently indicates 
that there is a non-monotonic relation between CEO experiences with fatal disasters during 
childhood and corporate risk-taking. Simply put, compared to CEOs with no disaster experience, 
moderate disaster fatality experience is associated with riskier corporate policies, while extreme 
disaster fatality experience is associated with less risky policies.  
[Insert TABLE IV here] 
Specifically, the evidence in Column 1 shows that there is an inverse-U shaped relation 
between fatal disaster experience and firm financial leverage. All else equal, firms whose CEOs 
experienced a moderate level of fatalities from natural disasters have a 3.3% higher leverage 
than firms whose CEOs have no fatal disaster experience. In contrast, firms whose CEOs 
experienced an extreme level of fatalities from disasters have a 3.5% lower leverage than firms 
whose CEOs have no fatal disaster experience (and thus, 6.8% lower leverage than firms whose 
CEOs have a medium level of fatal disaster experience). The economic magnitude of the effects 
documented in Column 1 is large relative to the sample mean (25.4%) and standard deviation 
(18.2%) of financial leverage. For example, the difference in leverage between Medium and 
Extreme Fatality CEOs is comparable to the effect of a four standard deviation change in the 
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Market-to-Book ratio (-1.1%×1.41×4 = -6.21%), traditionally one of the strongest documented 
determinants of capital structure. 
The estimates reported in Column 4 mirror those reported in Column 1, indicating that there 
is a U-shaped relation between the firms’ propensity to hold cash and CEO disaster experience. 
All else equal, firms whose CEOs experienced a moderate level of fatalities from natural 
disasters hold 1.2% less cash per dollar of assets than firms whose CEOs experienced no fatal 
disasters. In contrast, firms whose CEOs experienced an extreme level of fatalities from disasters 
hold 2.2% more cash per dollar of assets than firms whose CEOs have no fatal disaster 
experience. As in the case of financial leverage, the economic magnitude of the effects is notably 
large: the difference in cash holding intensity between Medium and Extreme Fatality CEOs 
(3.7%) is equivalent to one third of the sample mean intensity and one quarter of its sample 
standard deviation. 
A potential concern with the results in Columns 1 and 3 of Tables IV is that the documented 
relation between CEO disaster experience and corporate financial policies may be due to 
spurious correlations resulting from unmodeled nonlinearities between corporate risk-taking and 
the other control variables. To account for this possibility, we follow two distinct approaches that 
relax the assumption of linear relations between corporate policies and all other control variables, 
in Columns 2 and 5 or 3 and 6, respectively.  
In Columns 2 and 5 of Table IV (for leverage and cash holdings, respectively), we replace 
each continuous control variable with sample decile indicators. This approach saturates the 
models with step functions for each continuous control variable and ensures that the step 
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function for CEO experience captures nonlinearities uniquely associated with disaster fatalities 
as opposed to a confounding source of variation. Alternatively, in Columns 3 and 6 of Table IV, 
we augment the baseline specifications by including higher order polynomials (up to the 3rd 
degree) for each continuous control variable. 
Across all columns, the results are very similar. Although their magnitude decreases slightly, 
the coefficient estimates of interest retain the same signs and remain highly statistically and 
economically significant. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the non-monotonic relation between 
CEO fatal disaster experience and corporate financial policies stems from spurious correlations 
due to nonlinearities between corporate risk-taking and other control variables. 
Overall, the results in Table IV indicate that there is a non-monotonic relation between 
CEO’s fatal disaster experience early in life and corporate financial policies that affect firm risk. 
In particular, CEOs with some fatal disaster experience are associated with riskier policies (i.e., 
higher leverage, lower cash holdings), whereas CEOs who witnessed extreme levels of disaster-
related fatalities are associated with more conservative corporate policies. This evidence supports 
the notion that CEOs with experience of risky events having ex post minor (major) consequences 
may be desensitized (sensitized) to the downside of risky behavior and take on more (less) risk 
when at the helm of a firm.  
A.1. Do Difference in Financial Policies Reflect Active Financing Decisions? 
The literature shows that corporate financial policies are sticky. Hence, it is plausible that the 
results in Table IV are due to CEOs only partially adjusting their firms’ capital structure over 
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time. Following Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), we examine the effect of CEOs’ disaster 
experience on their propensity to actively fill firm financing gaps via debt, external equity, or 
internal equity. Specifically, for each firm-year, we calculate the firm net financing deficit (FD) 
as cash dividends plus net investment plus change in working capital minus cash flows after 
interest and taxes, all scaled by lagged assets, as in Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011). Also, we 
compute net new debt issues as long-term debt issues minus long-term debt repayment, net new 
equity issues as sale of common and preferred stock minus repurchases, and changes in 
accumulated internal equity as the change in retained earnings, all scaled by lagged assets. Then 
we estimate OLS regression models where the dependent variable is the net new (debt, external 
or internal equity) capital and the main independent variable is FD interacted with indicators for 
CEOs disaster experience. Following Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, we include firm fixed effects 
and their interactions with FD. Hence, in these models, there is a separate intercept and slope for 
each firm, with the latter absorbing the average effect of changes in FD. In addition, we include 
all the control variables in Frank and Goyal (2003) and their interactions with FD: book leverage, 
changes in profitability, tangibility of assets, logarithm of sales, and Q. Lastly, as in our earlier 
tests, we include the average fatality risk of the CEO’s birth county, its square, and fixed effects 
for year, CEO birth state, and birth year.  
[Insert TABLE V here] 
Table V reports the results of these tests. To provide a benchmark, the specifications in 
Columns 1, 3, and 5 include FD as the only independent variable in the net debt, net external 
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equity, and net internal equity models, respectively. The corresponding coefficient estimates 
imply that, on average, firms finance a dollar of financing deficit by issuing 69 (33) cents of new 
debt (external equity) or drawing down 14 cents of accumulated internal equity. The magnitude 
of the net debt model, in particular, is very similar to those reported in Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003).12  
In Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table V, we augment the baseline models by including indicators 
for Medium Fatality and Extreme Fatality CEOs, their interactions with FD, and all other control 
variables. The evidence reveals that CEOs with different disaster experience systematically 
resort to different sources of capital to fill in their firms’ financing gaps. In particular, in the net 
debt model (Column 2), the coefficient on the interaction between Extreme Fatality and FD is 
negative and significant, while the interaction with Medium Fatality is positive and significant. 
The coefficients imply that Extreme Fatality CEOs use 15 cents less debt financing than No 
Fatality CEOs to cover financing deficits, while Medium Fatality CEOs use almost 5 cents more 
debt. This 20 cents difference in active debt financing per dollar deficit between the Medium and 
Extreme Fatality CEOs is economically sizable compared to the average marginal propensity 
documented in Column 1, 69 cents. Although the coefficient estimates in the external equity 
model have signs similar to the debt model (Column 4), the differences across CEO types are not 
significant. In contrast, the evidence shows that the propensity to accumulate and draw down 
internal equity (Column 6) differs significantly across CEO types, in a way that compensates for 
the differences in their reliance on external sources of capital. Specifically, when the firm has no 
financing deficit or a financing surplus (deficit), Extreme Fatality CEOs accumulate (tap into 
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accumulated) internal equity more heavily. Consistent with our main conjecture, these patterns 
suggest that CEOs’ disaster experience affects firms’ propensity to build (equity) reserves, which 
may be tapped into in times of need and reduce the firm reliance on external (debt) capital. 
Overall, the evidence in Table V suggests that differences in capital structure across CEO-
types stem from active financing decisions, rather than sticky leverage ratios due to passive 
adjustments. In particular, the dynamics of firms’ reliance on external debt versus internal equity 
capital are consistent with greater (lower) appetite for risk by Medium (Extreme) Fatality CEOs. 
A.2.  CEO Experience, Credit Risk, and Cost of Debt Capital 
The differences in firm-level financing decisions across CEO types should affect the firm 
credit risk and ultimately the cost of debt capital, if they are in fact due to differential risk-taking 
propensity rather than opportunistic behavior. In Table VI, we begin by investigating how firm 
credit ratings and likelihood of bankruptcy vary with CEO disaster experience.  
To conduct the ratings analysis, we categorize credit ratings in the Capital IQ’s Entity 
Ratings database on an integer scale from 0 to 26, with 0 corresponding to the lowest rating (i.e., 
‘D’) and 26 to the highest rating (i.e., ‘AAA’) in our sample. The modal rating in our sample is a 
BBB, in 15.34% of firm-years, while the median rating is a BBB+. Column 1 of Table VI reports 
estimates from an Ordered Probit model and Column 2 reports OLS coefficients. Both estimation 
approaches suffer some shortcomings. On the one hand, OLS estimation is less sensitive to the 
large number of fixed effects in the model, but requires a potentially problematic assumption that 
the “distance” between two adjacent rating categories is constant across the full range of ratings. 
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On the other hand, the Ordered Probit estimation accommodates varying distances between 
adjacent rating categories, but is potentially more sensitive to the large number of fixed effects. 
Therefore, we report the results from both approaches. Both models include all the standard 
controls and fixed effects from the baseline specification in Table IV. The sample size in this 
analysis drops by roughly half due to missing credit ratings. 
[Insert TABLE VI here] 
In line with our interpretation of earlier results, we find that firms with Medium Fatality 
CEOs have lower credit ratings, while firms with Extreme Fatality CEOs have higher credit 
ratings than the baseline group of firms with No Fatality CEOs. The difference between a firm 
with Medium Fatality CEOs and one with Extreme Fatality CEOs is approximately one whole 
(two-thirds of a) credit rating category based on the Ordered Probit (OLS) estimates. Thus, for 
the modal or median firm, this difference amounts to being rated as investment versus below-
investment grade and can have a large impact of the firm cost of debt capital. 
In Columns 3 and 4, we focus on extreme credit risk and examine how the likelihood of 
“Junk” rating (i.e., BBB and below) varies with CEO disaster experience. Controlling for firm 
fixed effects and average birth county risk (Column 3), we find that firms with Medium Fatality 
CEOs are 7.1% more likely than No Fatality CEOs to have below-investment grade ratings, 
while firms with Extreme Fatality CEOs are 8.8% less likely. Although some of these 
differences are absorbed by firm-level characteristics and other fixed effects (Column 4), the 
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inverse-U shaped relation between the likelihood of “Junk” rating and CEO disaster experience 
persists even in the more restrictive specification.  
A potential concern is that the firm’s choice to obtain a rating might depend on its CEO type 
and the resulting self-selection may hamper our inferences, given the large fraction of firm-years 
with missing credit ratings. To assess this possibility, we test whether CEOs’ disaster experience 
explains credit rating availability. Column 5 presents the estimates of a linear probability model 
where the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is not rated, and 0 
otherwise. We find no association between CEO disaster experience and the availability of a 
credit rating. This suggests that selection effects are unlikely to be driven by the CEO type and 
should have a limited impact on the interpretation of the results in Columns 1-4. 
The evidence in Columns 1-4 shows that market participants’ assessment of firm credit risk 
varies non-monotonically with CEOs’ disaster experience in childhood. To complement this 
analysis, we examine whether market participants’ expectations in fact line up with ex post 
realizations of bankruptcy. We obtain Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 filings from the UCLA-LoPucki 
Bankruptcy Research Database and define a firm-year indicator variable Bankrupt Next Year 
(Bankrupt Next 2 Years) that is equal to 1 if the firm files for bankruptcy in the following year 
(next two years), and 0 otherwise. In line with the credit rating results, the evidence in Columns 
6 and 7 shows that firms with Medium (Extreme) Fatality CEOs are significantly more (less) 
likely to file for bankruptcy than No Fatality CEOs and the estimated effects are economically 
large. The difference between the incremental likelihood of bankruptcy for firms with Medium 
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and Extreme Fatality CEOs is approximately twice as large as the unconditional probability for 
the mean firm-year in our sample, 1%. 
Next, in Table VII, we investigate whether the firm’s cost of debt capital reflects the effect of 
the CEO’s attitude toward risk as proxied by early-life disaster experience. All models reported 
in the table explicitly control for firm leverage. Hence, the estimated effect of CEO disaster 
experience on the cost of debt capital is incremental relative to the effect of firm leverage. This is 
important given that our earlier results show that there is a strong relation between financial 
leverage and CEO type.  
We begin by measuring cost of debt as reported interest expenses scaled by the amount of 
long-term debt. While this measure is desirable due to its wide availability for most firm-years in 
our sample (as opposed to the cost of newly issued debt), there are shortcomings. First, a missing 
or zero value for interest expenses does not imply that the cost of raising debt capital is actually 
zero. Therefore, we drop these observations from our sample. Second, given their backward 
looking nature, it is not obvious that reported annual interest expenses reflect the effect of the 
current CEO’s attitude toward risk. For this reason, in subsequent tests, we examine the cost of 
newly issued debt. 
[Insert TABLE VII here] 
The results in Column 1 of Table VII indicate that firms with Medium Fatality CEOs, on 
average, report 1.6% higher annual interest expenses per dollar of outstanding long-term debt 
than No Fatality CEOs. Conversely, firms with Extreme Fatality CEOs have 1.5% lower interest 
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rate expense, yielding a difference of 3.1% between Medium and Extreme Fatality CEOs. Thus, 
the inverse-U shaped relation that manifests in the firm capital structure and credit risk also holds 
when we examine the ex post cost of debt and its effect is economically significant.  
Given the shortcomings of the reported interest expenses used in Column 1, we conduct 
supplemental tests that examine the relation between CEO disaster experience and the cost of 
debt at the issue-level at the time of the issue. The main advantage of this approach is the direct 
link between the cost of debt and the CEO leading the firm at the time of the issue. Columns 2-4 
and 5-7 in Table VII report the results of this analysis for bank loans and bond issues, 
respectively. We obtain the bank loan-level data from Deal Scan for the period between 1992 
and 2012, and use the “all in spread” as the cost of debt at the time of loan initiation. We obtain 
the bond issue-level data from Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) for the period 
between 1992 and 2012, and use the spread between newly issued bonds’ yield-to-maturity and 
the yield on U.S. treasury of equivalent maturity. Following Ivashina (2009), we control for a 
wide array of factors that may affect the cost of new debt, in addition to controls for the birth 
county average fatality rate and its square, fixed effects for year, birth year, birth state, firm, and 
(in the bank loan models) lead lender. 
Column 2 of Table VII reports estimates of the model including only year and lead lender 
fixed effects as controls. Conditional on receiving a bank loan, firms with Medium Fatality 
CEOs pay 18.9 basis points higher spread and firms with Extreme Fatality CEOs pay 20.6 basis 
points lower spread than firms with No Fatality CEOs. Including fixed effects for CEO birth year 
and birth state in column 3 yield similar results and economic magnitudes. The specification in 
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Column 4 includes all other deal-level characteristics that likely depend on the lender’s 
assessment of borrowers’ credit risk (e.g., collateral, covenants) and firm fixed effects. Although 
controlling for these characteristics absorbs some of the CEO-type effects, there continues to be 
an inverse-U shaped relation between the cost of new bank loans and CEO disaster experience. 
Specifically, loans contracted by Medium Fatality CEOs are charged significantly higher spreads 
than those by No Fatality and Extreme Fatality CEOs. 
The remaining columns of Table VII report the results of similar models for the spread over 
Treasury of newly issued bonds. Although in the full model (Column 7) the sign of the estimated 
coefficient on Medium Fatality CEOs is consistent with a higher cost of debt, the effect is not 
statically significant in any of the specifications. In contrast, the effect of CEO exposure to 
extreme disaster fatalities in childhood is negative and economically large across all 
specifications, in line with the bank loan results. The lack of robust results for the Medium 
Fatality CEOs may be due to the arm-length nature of bond issues, which can make their pricing 
less sensitive to CEOs’ personal characteristics. Alternatively, the lack of significant effects on 
the pricing of public debt for Medium Fatality CEOs may be due to endogenous selection in 
credit markets. In other words, given the higher credit risk of firms led by Medium Fatality 
CEOs, it is plausible that riskier firms would be precluded access to the public debt market and 
be forced to resort to bank financing, in line with our earlier results. Overall, however, the 
combined evidence in Table VII is largely consistent with the notion that the effect of CEO 
disaster experience on the aggressiveness of financial policies ultimately affects the firm cost of 
debt capital. 
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B. CEO Disaster Experience and Corporate Acquisition Activity 
Existing studies suggest that CEOs exert significant decision-making power in the context of 
mergers and acquisitions and, whether due to empire building or managerial hubris, CEOs may 
engage in acquisitions at the expense of the firm shareholders (Jensen (1986), Roll (1986)). 
Indeed, corporate acquisitions are inherently riskier compared to organic internal growth due to 
the typically large commitment of time and resources required. Therefore, in our next set of tests, 
we examine whether CEO fatal disaster experience explains corporate acquisition activity. To 
conduct these tests, we obtain merger announcements that involve public targets between 1992 
and 2012 available in the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions 
database. After excluding buybacks, share repurchases, self-tenders, and spinoffs, there are 2,883 
merger announcements in our sample. Then, we estimate a series of linear probability models to 
assess whether CEO attitude toward risk, as measured by childhood experiences of fatal 
disasters, has a material impact on firm acquisitiveness. The structure of these tests is similar to 
those reported in Table IV for the corporate financial policies models and their results are 
reported in Table VIII.  
[Insert TABLE VIII here] 
The evidence in Table VIII is line with the results of our earlier tests. Across all 
specifications, the effect of CEO’s childhood experience with fatal disasters on firm 
acquisitiveness is statistically significant at conventional levels and crucially depends on the 
severity of the disaster consequences witnessed by the CEO. Specifically, the evidence supports 
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the existence of an inverse U-shaped relation between CEO fatal disaster experience and 
corporate acquisitiveness. The estimates imply that firms led by Extreme Fatality CEOs are 8.1% 
less likely to attempt an acquisition in a given year than firms with No Fatality CEOs. In stark 
contrast, firms led by Medium Fatality CEOs are 6.1% more likely to engage in at least one 
acquisition of another public company than firms with No Fatality CEOs. This in turn implies a 
14.2% difference in the probability of an acquisition by Extreme Fatality versus Medium Fatality 
CEOs. The effect is economically sizeable, given that the average probability of announcing an 
acquisition is 30% with a standard deviation of 45.7%. Although the baseline estimates are based 
on linear probability models for tractability and the presence of a large number of fixed effects, 
the results are robust when we estimate logit models without fixed effects. 
B.1. CEO Early-Life Disaster Experience and Mergers Characteristics and Outcomes 
Next, we examine in greater depth whether CEO disaster experience affects economic 
decisions and outcomes associated with corporate acquisition activity. In particular, for each 
announcement in our sample, we calculate four deal-specific variables that are germane to our 
main conjecture: the proposed method of payment, the acquirer announcement returns, whether 
the target is in the same industry as the acquirer, and the pre-merger correlation between the 
acquirer and target stock returns.  
We define an All Stock Acquisition variable as an indicator equal to 1 if the merger offer 
includes acquirer stock only, and 0 otherwise. Paying for the acquisition with acquirer stock 
reduces the risk resulting from unforeseen issues with the target valuation. Thus, all else equal, 
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an all-stock acquisition is less risky than paying for the acquisition with cash. The Announcement 
CAR is the acquirer cumulative abnormal return during trading days [-2, +2] around the merger 
announcement based on the market model. We define an Unrelated Acquisition variable as an 
indicator equal to 1 if the target is not in the same Fama-French 17 industry as the acquirer, and 0 
otherwise. Lastly, we calculate the stock return correlation between acquirer and target daily 
returns over trading days [-250,-22]. All models include acquirer industry-by-year, CEO birth 
year, and CEO birth state fixed effects. Similar to prior tests, standard errors are clustered at the 
acquiring firm level. In addition, we include a host of control variables identified in the prior 
literature as relevant factors affecting our merger outcomes (e.g., Eckbo (2015)). Table IX 
reports the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is one of the deal-specific 
variables described. 
[Insert TABLE IX here] 
Column 1 reports estimates of a linear probability model where the dependent variable is the 
All Stock indicator. Firms with Medium Fatality CEOs are 7.4% less likely to make an all-stock 
acquisition than No Fatality CEOs. In our sample, roughly 25% of announcements are all-stock, 
making this a sizeable effect. Extreme Fatality CEOs, on the other hand, are equally likely to 
make an all-stock acquisition as No Fatality CEOs. Thus, Medium Fatality CEOs are less likely 
to make all-stock acquisitions than both No Fatality and Extreme Fatality CEOs, consistent with 
a non-monotonic relation between disaster experience and risk attitudes. 
- 30 - 
 
The evidence in Column 2 indicates that merger announcements by acquiring firms with 
Medium Fatality CEOs earn 0.57% lower abnormal returns during the five trading days around 
the announcement. In contrast, acquiring firms with Extreme Fatality CEOs earn 1.25% higher 
abnormal returns than those in the No Fatality group. It appears therefore that capital markets 
penalize mergers offers by Medium Fatality CEOs and reward those by Extreme Fatality CEOs. 
This supports the notion that investors view merger offers by Medium Fatality CEOs as 
excessively risky relative to those by other CEO types. 
The lower returns associated with Medium Fatality CEOs may be due to a higher propensity 
to venture into unrelated acquisitions, where the acquiring firm lacks target-specific expertise 
and finds it harder to attain synergistic gains due to complementarities or cost savings. Indeed, 
the evidence in Column 3 shows that Medium Fatality CEOs are 7.9% more likely to announce 
unrelated acquisitions, while Extreme Fatality CEOs are not significantly different from the No 
Fatality CEOs along this dimension. Therefore, again in line with our earlier inference, there is a 
markedly non-monotonic relation between risk-taking in mergers and CEOs’ fatal disaster 
experience in childhood. 
Although unrelated acquisitions are likely associated with a greater difficulty of realizing 
synergies and may require CEOs to extend beyond their area of expertise, these deals may also 
reduce risk via a diversification effect. We examine this possibility by analyzing the stock return 
correlation between bidder and target stock returns, conditional on the type of merger – that is, 
diversifying vs. focused deals. If Medium Fatality CEOs aim to reduce the firm’s overall risk 
through diversifying acquisitions, then these acquisitions would involve targets whose pre-
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merger returns are less correlated with bidder returns. However, we find that this is not the case, 
as seen in Columns 4 and 5. Within the sample of diversifying mergers (Column 4), Medium 
Fatality CEOs are not associated with acquisitions involving either a higher or lower correlation 
with the target, and the same is true within the sample of focused mergers (Column 5). 
C. CEO Disaster Experience and Stock Return Volatility 
The results in Tables IV and VIII pertain to corporate policies that theory suggests affect the 
risk borne by investors that hold the firm’s equity. Hence, in a sense, those tests provide an ex 
ante perspective on firm riskiness. A natural implication of the earlier evidence is that ex post 
realized volatility of equity returns should also depend on CEOs’ attitude toward risk, as 
captured by early-life natural disaster experiences. We examine this conjecture next.  
Table X reports estimates from pooled OLS regressions where the dependent variables are 
various measures of annualized volatility of daily stock returns over the fiscal year. In particular, 
Columns 1-3 report estimates for various specifications of the model where total volatility is the 
dependent variable, whereas Columns 2-6 report similar estimates for the idiosyncratic 
component of total volatility, calculated using a CAPM market model.13 Across the various 
columns of Table X, the model specifications are similar to those reported in Tables IV and VIII.  
[Insert TABLE X here] 
In line with the results for corporate policies, the evidence in Table X shows that there is a 
marked and robust inverse-U shaped relation between CEO early life experience with fatal 
disasters and realized volatility of stock returns. The estimates in Column 1 indicate that firms 
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whose CEOs are in the Medium Fatality group are associated with a 3.73% higher annualized 
stock volatility than firms whose CEOs are in the no fatal disaster group. In contrast, firms 
whose CEOs are in the Extreme Fatality group are associated with a 3.61% lower annualized 
stock volatility than firms whose CEOs are in the no fatal disaster group. Hence, all else equal, 
the average difference in annualized stock return volatility between firms with Medium and 
Extreme Fatality CEOs is more than 7%. Once again, the economic magnitude of this spread is 
large, at one fifth of the mean (35.05%) and almost one third of the standard deviation (22.72%) 
of the sample annualized stock return volatility.  
In Column 4 of Table X, we repeat the analysis in Column 1 after decomposing total stock 
return volatility into its systematic and idiosyncratic components, and focusing on the latter. The 
patterns documented in Column 4 are consistent with the results obtained for total stock return 
volatility. Specifically, CEOs in the Medium Fatality group are associated with significantly 
higher and CEOs in the Extreme Fatality group are associated significantly lower idiosyncratic 
stock volatility than CEOs in the no fatal disaster group. Moreover, compared to untabulated 
results for the systematic component of return volatility, the idiosyncratic volatility spreads 
across CEO disaster groups are notably larger, approximately three times, than the spreads 
observed for systematic volatility. In the augmented models that account for the nonlinear effects 
of the control variables, in Columns 2-3 and 5-6, the estimated coefficients on CEOs’ disaster 
experiences are very similar to those in the more parsimonious models in Columns 1 and 4. 
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Overall, the evidence in Table X supports the notion that the relation between the riskiness of 
corporate policies and CEOs’ early life experiences with natural disasters has a first order impact 
on the risk borne by the firm equity investors. 
IV. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we discuss the results of a series of tests that aim to assess the robustness of 
our baseline results and main inferences. 
A.  Alternative measures of CEO early-life disaster experience 
A potential concern with our identification of the effects of CEOs’ disaster experience stems 
from the ad hoc nature of our measure and the threshold that we use to separate Medium and 
Extreme Fatality CEOs. In Table IA.V of the Internet Appendix, we examine the robustness of 
our baseline results when: 1) we use different thresholds to categorize CEOs’ experiences (Panel 
A and B); 2) we model the effect of CEO experience using a more general quadratic 
specification (Panel C); 3) we categorize CEO experience based on disaster-related economic 
damages rather than fatalities (Panel D); and 4) we categorize CEOs based on their “abnormal” 
experiences with disaster-related fatalities relative to the birth county’s long run mean (Panel E). 
In Panels A and B of Table IA.V, we classify as Extreme Fatality CEOs those whose fatal 
disaster experience falls above the sample 15th and 5th percentiles, respectively. The evidence in 
these panels is largely consistent with our baseline results across the various corporate policies 
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and measures of return volatility that we examine. Thus, our inferences seem robust with respect 
to the threshold chosen to classify CEOs into more and less risk-averse individuals.  
In Panel C, we use an alternative specification based on the underlying continuous measure 
of CEO fatal disaster experience. Across the various models, the results are consistent with our 
baseline evidence. While the linear term is statistically significant and in the direction of more 
risk-taking behavior (positive for leverage, volatility, acquisitiveness, and negative for cash 
holdings), the squared term is also significant but holds the opposite sign. Most important, the 
implied in-sample maxima (minimum in the case of cash holdings) are very close to the cutoff 
levels we use to identify extreme fatality experience. Across the various models, the implied 
maximum (minimum in the case of cash holdings) hovers around a fatalities rate of about 0.05%, 
similar to the 10th percentile value of disaster experience used in our baseline classification. 
In Panel D, we categorize CEO experience based on economic damages from disasters rather 
than fatalities. The results based on this classification are again in line with our fatality-based 
tests. This is perhaps not surprising given that the sample correlation between the fatality- and 
the damages-based measures of CEO experience is very high (i.e., Pearson correlation=0.831). 
Indeed, while it would be interesting to disentangle the effect of witnessing disaster-related 
economic damages versus fatalities on a CEO’s subsequent risk-taking propensity, the high 
correlation between the two measures makes it practically unfeasible. We ultimately favor the 
fatalities-based measure in our tests because it is likely measured with lower error, especially in 
the earlier portion of the county-disaster dataset. 
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In Panel E, we modify our classification approach and use the “abnormal” fatality rate in the 
CEO’s birth county during the relevant ten-year window. Specifically, first, we define the 
abnormal fatality rate as the difference between the actual fatality rate and the corresponding 
mean in the CEO’s birth county during the period from 1900 to 2010. Then, we proceed to 
classify CEOs into three groups using the following scheme: CEOs in the bottom three deciles of 
the abnormal fatality distribution are classified as “Low”, those in the 4th to 9th deciles inclusive 
are classified as Medium Fatality, while those in the highest decile are classified as Extreme 
Fatality. We choose these decile cutoffs to closely mimic the distribution of the baseline measure 
of CEO disaster experience (approximately 30% No Fatality, 60% Medium Fatality, and 10% 
Extreme Fatality). The results from this alternative approach are in line with our earlier evidence. 
Overall, the supplemental evidence presented in Table AI.V shows that our inferences about 
the relation between corporate risk taking and CEO risk attitude continue to hold when we rely 
on alternative empirical approaches to characterize CEO’s childhood disaster experience. 
Another potential concern is that we do not in fact know whether a CEO lived in the county 
of birth between the age of 5 and 15. While it may be the case that we measure with error the 
CEO’s location of residence during the relevant time period, this should only add noise, but no 
bias, in our analysis. Nevertheless, we attempt to address such concern in three ways. First, we 
repeat our earlier tests while using a shorter window, [t+5, t+10], which should reduce the 
measurement error related to CEOs’ location of residence. By and large, as shown in Table 
IA.VI of the Internet Appendix, our results (and to a certain extent even the magnitudes of our 
coefficients) continue to hold. Second, in Table IA.VII of the Internet Appendix, we restrict our 
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sample to CEOs for whom we can verify that they resided in their birth-state when they obtained 
their social security number (SSN), typically around the age of 15 (Yonker (2012)).14 The CEO’s 
birth-state and SSN-state coincide in about 75% of the cases. In this subsample, our empirical 
approach should result in lower measurement error. Across the board, our empirical results 
become stronger both statistically and economically when we restrict the sample to CEOs whose 
early-life experiences are measured with lower measurement error. 
[Insert TABLE XI here] 
Third, we conduct a placebo test where we randomly assign (with replacement) a birth 
county to each CEO based on the sample distribution of CEO birth counties. We measure the 
disaster experience at this randomly generated county, re-run the analysis in Tables IV, VIII, and 
X, and repeat the exercise 500 times. Table XI reports the average coefficient for the main 
independent variables over the 500 repetitions and the percentage of coefficients that are 
significant at the 5% level. Consistent with our expectations, approximately 5% of the 
coefficients are significant at the 5% level, and those cases are roughly equally split between 
positive and negative. Moreover, attesting to the significance of our main results, the estimated 
coefficients are statically significant and in the “right direction” at most between 0.4% and 1.6% 
of the replications. This evidence strongly suggests that our measure of early-life disaster 
experiences very likely reflects an economically meaningful characterization of CEOs’ risk 
attitudes, as opposed to random noise.  
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B. Omitted Variables 
Another concern is the potential systematic link between certain U.S. regions and our 
measure of CEOs’ risk preferences, given that certain regions of the country are more exposed to 
natural disasters (hurricanes in Florida or earthquakes in California, for example). This could 
result in spurious effects of CEOs’ disaster experience, if the latter is systematically correlated 
with non-disaster related characteristics of the place of birth such as economic conditions, crime 
rate, or quality of education. A related concern is that, although the decision to live in a disaster-
prone area is not taken by the child, it may reflect the parents’ risk preferences and the latter 
rather than the disaster experience would affect the CEO’s preferences.  
In our tests, we address these concerns in three ways. First, we note that our earlier tests 
control for the average disaster fatality risk of the CEO’s county of birth from 1900-2010 and its 
square. The addition of this control ensures that the results are not merely due to CEOs with fatal 
disaster experience hailing from high risk counties. Even if CEOs cluster by region on any 
number of characteristics, after controlling for the average time-series disaster risk of the county 
of birth, the existence of fatal disasters during a particular ten year period that a CEO resides 
there should be effectively random.15 Second, all models include fixed effects for the CEO’s 
state of birth, which absorb time-invariant factors at the state-level – for example, consistently 
better public education or economic conditions in a state. Lastly, in an attempt to further absorb 
time or geographic effects, we conduct supplemental tests to isolate the effect of major disasters 
by focusing only on the difference between affected versus neighboring counties. Specifically, 
we define a “Treatment” group as the set of CEOs who experienced a major fatal disaster (as 
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defined in footnote 9 of Section II.C) in their county of birth over the period [t+5, t+15] years. 
We define the “Control” group as the set of CEOs who did not experience a major disaster in 
their birth county, but were within the age of 5 to 15 years old in unaffected counties located 
within 100 miles from the major disaster. The evidence reported in Table XII shows that our 
main findings are unchanged, and in some instances become stronger, when analyzing the 
difference in our outcome variables between the CEOs in the “Treatment” and “Control” groups. 
The CEOs who experienced a major disaster in their birth counties are associated with lower 
leverage, stock volatility, acquisitiveness, and higher cash holdings relative to CEOs who resided 
in unaffected counties located within 100 miles of the disaster zone. 
[Insert TABLE XII here] 
C. CEO and Firm Matching 
Although our models control for firm fixed effects, the latter only absorb time-invariant firm-
level factors and the timing of CEO turnover is not typically exogenous. Hence, dynamic 
matching of CEOs to firms is a potential concern, to the extent that firm style changes 
significantly over time and the resulting CEO turnover depends on the executives’ risk 
preferences as captured by our measures.  
In order to better identify the causal effect of CEOs’ attitude toward risk, we examine 
exogenous CEO turnover events as classified in Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013).16 Of 678 CEO 
turnover events in our sample, 85 are classified as having exogenous timing and have non-
missing observations over a 4-year window around the event. Among these, there are 41 cases 
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where the CEO’s risk attitude type changes. We calculate the changes in firms’ industry-adjusted 
book leverage, cash-to-asset ratio, acquisitiveness, and stock volatility from two years prior to 
two years after the CEO turnover events. We then test whether the changes in the outcome 
variables around CEO turnover are consistent with higher (lower) risk-taking when the incoming 
CEO is more (less) risk-tolerant than the outgoing CEO.  
[Insert TABLE XIII here] 
Despite the small sample size, the evidence in Table XIII is consistent with a causal effect of 
CEOs’ risk tolerance as shaped by early-life disaster experience on firm risk-taking. For 
instance, the mean difference of changes in industry-adjusted book leverage around More Risk-
Tolerant versus Less Risk-Tolerant CEO turnover events is positive (1.98%, with a t-statistic of 
1.81). Similarly, the mean difference of changes in industry-adjusted stock volatility, total and 
idiosyncratic, and firm acquisition propensity is positive and statistically significant. The results 
for the changes in cash holdings are qualitatively similar (i.e., increase in cash holdings for Less 
Risk-Tolerant versus More Risk-Tolerant CEO turnover events), but not statistically significant. 
It is worth noting that because the variables of interest are adjusted by industry-year means, the 
results cannot be explained by industry or time trends that may be correlated with CEO turnover. 
Although Table XIII provides plausible evidence that CEOs’ risk preferences have a causal 
effect on the risk taking of the firms that they lead, this interpretation warrants a caveat. Indeed, 
while the timing of the old CEO’s exit is plausibly exogenous, the board’s choice of the 
successor is not. Hence, matching dynamics could still be at work, whereby the board appoints 
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the CEO candidate whose risk preferences would foster the prompt implementation of a desired 
change of direction with respect to the firm’s risk taking. While it is unfeasible to design a 
natural experiment that definitively rules out this explanation, at the very least, the evidence in 
Table XIII indicates that CEO risk preferences play a major role at the hiring stage, if the board 
of directors aims to attain significant changes in corporate policies and risk-taking. 
V. Conclusions 
A growing body of literature on managerial fixed effects attributes at least part of these 
effects to prior life experiences. These studies typically posit a monotonic relation between a 
CEO’s life experience and corporate policies, showing that exposure to specific macroeconomic, 
personal, or professional events have a single unidirectional effect on a CEO’s decision-making.  
In contrast, we conjecture that the intensity of life experiences can result in non-linear effects 
on subsequent risk taking. We find that there is a non-monotonic relation between CEOs’ early-
life exposure to fatal disasters and several corporate policies including leverage, cash holdings, 
stock volatility, and acquisitiveness. Our results support the hypothesis that experiencing fatal 
disasters without extremely negative consequences desensitizes CEOs to the negative 
consequences of risk. In contrast, CEOs who witnessed the extreme downside potential of 
disasters appear to be more cautious in approaching risk when at the helm of a firm. Ultimately, 
the link between CEOs’ disaster experience and corporate policies has real economic 
consequences on firm riskiness and cost of capital. 
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Our results are robust to including firm fixed effects and controls for non-disaster related 
factors at the county or state of birth level. For instance, we find significant differences between 
CEOs who experienced major disasters and those who grew up in geographically contiguous 
areas during the same time, but did not experience major disasters. Moreover, the results from 
difference-in-difference tests that we conduct on a set of exogenously timed turnover events 
show that changes in CEO risk tolerance are shortly followed by changes in firm risk taking in 
the same direction. Therefore, although it is plausible that CEOs’ risk preferences as shaped by 
early-life natural disasters determine the matching between firm and CEO styles to some extent, 
the evidence is consistent with a direct link between CEOs’ risk attitude and corporate policies. 
Our results also have important implications for the growing literature on investor 
experiences and portfolio allocation, which makes similar binary assumptions regarding the 
effect of risk exposure on investment behavior. Examining nonlinearities between investors’ life 
experiences and risk taking may be an equally promising endeavor for future research. 
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 Appendix – Data sources for natural disasters 
Earthquakes, floods, and landslides: Our main data sources are the United States Geological 
Survey (USGS), which provides a list of events going back to 1900, and the National 
Geophysical Data Center (NGDC).17 For each earthquake in the USGS database, we collect all 
available information. If USGS or NGDC do not provide a complete record of a specific event 
(i.e., missing details on county location, or damages, or injuries/fatalities), we perform a web-
search with the following parameters to retrieve related news articles or historical records: 
“earthquake or flood or landslide + state location + event year”. The USGS and NGDC are also 
our main source of information for volcanic eruptions,18 which we supplement with Science 
Daily’s database on volcanic events. If none of these sources provide a complete record of the 
event, we perform a web-search with the following parameters to retrieve related news articles or 
historical records: “volcano + state location + event year”.  
Tsunamis: We obtain data on the location and date of the event, as well as all other relevant 
information from two main sources: Tsunamis.findthedata.org and the NGDC website.19 If we 
cannot retrieve all relevant information for a recorded tsunami event, we perform a web-search 
with the following parameters to retrieve related news articles or historical records: “tsunami + 
state location + event year”.  
Hurricanes, tornadoes, and severe storm events: Our main data sources are the data archive 
of the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) and National Weather Service (NWS) of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.20 For each recorded event, we track the 
affected counties and retrieve the relevant information available from these sources. If we cannot 
 obtain all relevant information for a recorded event, we perform a web-search with the following 
parameters to retrieve related news article or historical records: “hurricane or tornado or severe 
storm + state location + event year”.  
Wild fires: Our main sources are the lists of events available through Wikipedia 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fires and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wildfires) and 
GenDisasters (at http://www.gendisasters.com/fires/index.htm).21 If we cannot obtain the 
relevant information for a recorded event from these sources, we perform a web-search with the 
following parameters to retrieve related news article or historical records: “fire + state location + 
event year”. In all the cases above, we record all relevant information only if the web search is 
successful. Otherwise we discard the event from the database.  
 Table I – County-level Natural Disaster Characteristics 
Panel A reports summary statistics for our sample of natural disasters in the United States during the period 1900-2010. 
Panel B summarizes time-invariant characteristics related to CEO early-life disaster experience. Extreme Fatality 
Experience is an indicator variable equal to 1 for CEOs who are in top decile for the number of disaster-related fatalities 
per capita experienced in their birth county, and 0 otherwise. Medium Fatality Experience is an indicator variable equal to 1 
for CEOs who experienced some disaster-related fatalities in their birth-county but are not in the Extreme Fatality 
Experience group, and 0 otherwise. No Fatality Experience is an indicator variable equal to 1 for CEOs who experienced 
no disaster-related fatalities in their birth-county, and 0 otherwise. All dollar values are inflation-adjusted to 2009. In all 
cases, the time window for measuring disaster-related experiences is between 5 and 15 years after the CEO birth, inclusive. 
Average County Fatal Disaster Risk is equal to the average annual fatalities from natural disasters scaled by county 
population over 1900-2010 for the CEO’s birth county. Following Malmendier et. al. (2011), Depression Baby is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for CEOs born between 1920 and 1929, inclusive, and 0 otherwise. Panel C reports the top 10 
birth states over all the CEOs and their distribution into the three disaster experience categories. For example, 251 CEOs 
are born in New York. 11.16% of the 251 CEOs born in New York did not experience any fatal disasters during the ages of 
5-15 and are categorized in the No Fatality group. Panel D reports the top 10 birth states for CEOs in the No Fatality, 
Medium Fatality, or Extreme Fatality groups, and the number of CEOs from that state that belong to that disaster 
experience group. For example, New York is the modal birth state for CEOs in the No Fatality group. 69 CEOs in the No 
Fatality group were born in New York. 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Natural Disasters 1900-2010 
 
Disaster Type N Mean No. of Fatalities 
Mean Fatalities 
per capita 
Mean Economic 
Damage  
(2009$, Mil.) 
Earthquake 806 4.7455 0.0605 87.677 
Hurricane 9,665 2.4280 0.0482 17.376 
Severe Weather 237,930 0.0581 0.0004 0.400 
Urban Fire 2,466 6.0815 0.0164 10.295 
Volcano 9 0.5556 0.1370 17.742 
Weather 404,837 0.0490 0.0003 0.505 
Wild Fire 2,206 0.0633 0.0002 7.949 
All 657,919 0. 115 0.001 0.884 
 
  
 Panel B: Time invariant disaster-related CEO characteristics 
 
CEO-specific Variables N Mean Std. Dev. 
No Fatality Experience 1,508 0.332 0.471 
Medium Fatality Experience 1,508 0.558 0.497 
Extreme Fatality Experience 1,508 0.110 0.314 
No. of Disasters Experienced 1,508 25.867 41.86 
No. of Fatal Disasters Experienced 1,508 3.906 5.408 
Total Fatalities Experienced 1,508 15.708 38.515 
Fatalities per Capita (%) 1,508 0.027 0.037 
Economic Damage Experienced ($M) 1,508 0.216 1.881 
Economic Damage Per Square Mile ($M) 1,508 0.012 0.591 
Average Fatality Risk of County 1900-2010 1,508 0.032 0.211 
Average Econ. Damage Risk of County 1900-2010 1,508 0.301 1.229 
 
Panel C: Top 10 CEO Birth States and Disaster Experience 
 
Top 10 Birth 
States for all 
CEOs 
No. of 
CEOs 
% in No 
Fatality 
% in 
Medium 
Fatality 
% in 
Extreme 
Fatality 
New York 251 27.49% 61.35% 11.16% 
Illinois 116 33.62% 55.17% 11.21% 
Pennsylvania 110 20.91% 59.09% 20.00% 
Ohio 84 26.19% 65.48% 8.33% 
California 71 25.35% 64.79% 9.86% 
Massachusetts 69 30.43% 57.97% 11.59% 
New Jersey 64 37.50% 53.13% 9.38% 
Texas 60 38.33% 55.00% 6.67% 
Missouri 43 30.23% 48.84% 20.93% 
Iowa 41 17.07% 68.29% 14.63% 
 
Panel D: Top 10 CEO Birth States by Disaster Experience Categories 
 
Top 10 Birth States for 
No Fatality CEOs 
No. of 
CEOs 
 Top 10 Birth States for 
Medium Fatality CEOs 
No. of 
CEOs 
 Top 10 Birth States for 
Extreme Fatality CEOs 
No. of 
CEOs 
New York 69  New York 154  New York 28 
Illinois 39  Pennsylvania 65  Pennsylvania 22 
New Jersey 24  Illinois 64  Illinois 13 
Pennsylvania 23  Ohio 55  Missouri 9 
Texas 23  California 46  Massachusetts 8 
Ohio 22  Massachusetts 40  California 7 
Massachusetts 21  New Jersey 34  Ohio 7 
California 18  Texas 33  Kentucky 7 
Missouri 13  Iowa 28  Washington 6 
Mississippi 12  Indiana 28  New Jersey 6 
  
 Table II – Comparison of CEO and U.S. Population Disaster Experience 
This table compares the disaster experience of CEOs in our sample with the population probabilities. The annual population 
of each county is used to calculate the fraction of U.S. residents that experienced each type of disaster in a given year. 
Column 1 reports the fraction of U.S. residents that experienced each type of disaster in a typical year, where each year is 
weighted by the total U.S. population. Column 2 reports the cumulative probability of disaster experience for the typical 
member of the U.S. population over a ten-year period. Column 3 reports the incidence of disasters during the relevant ten 
years of our sample CEOs’ early-life. Column 4 reports the results of a two-sided z-test for differences in proportions 
reported in Columns 2 and 3. For example, across the U.S. over 1900-2010, in a given year, 21.09% of the population 
experienced at least one disaster in our database (Column 1). Over a typical ten year period, the probability of not 
experiencing any disaster is 9.3% ((1-21.09%)10) which implies that the probability of experiencing a disaster over the ten 
year period is 90.63% (Column 2). 80.20% of CEOs in our sample experienced at least one disaster over years [t+5,t+15] 
after birth (Column 3). A disaster with “major fatalities” is one with at least 5 fatalities and fatalities scaled by county 
population greater than 0.05%. A disaster with “major economic damage” is one with at least $1 million of property and 
crop damage (inflation-adjusted). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Disaster Type 
Population Annual 
Probability of 
Experiencing at least 
one Disaster 
Population 10-Year 
Probability of 
Experiencing at least 
one Disaster 
CEO 10-Year 
Realized Incidence 
of Experiencing at 
least one Disaster 
z-test of 
Difference 
(3)-(2) 
Any Disaster 21.09% 90.63% 80.20% -14.80*** 
With Fatalities 10.73% 67.86% 66.80% -0.94 
With Major Fatalities 1.24% 11.73% 10.22% -0.61 
With Major Econ Damages 1.11% 10.56% 10.87% 0.14 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 Table III – Time-Varying Firm Characteristics 
This table reports summary statistics for various firm-year characteristics. The first two columns include all firm-
years in the sample, while in the remaining columns the sample is restricted to firm-years with CEOs in the 
groups with No Fatality, Medium Fatality, or Extreme Fatality disaster experience, respectively. Market-to-Book 
ratio is defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at fiscal year-end. Book 
Leverage is the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities divided by book assets. Cash-to-Assets is the ratio of 
cash and marketable securities divided by the book assets. I(Dividend Paying) is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the firm pays dividend during the year, and zero otherwise. ROA is defined as net income divided by book 
equity. Stock volatility is the annualized volatility (%) calculated from the standard deviation of daily stock returns 
during the fiscal year, and Idiosyncratic Volatility and Systematic Volatility are calculated using a CAPM market 
model. CEO Age is the age of the firm’s CEO as of the fiscal year end. Announced Acquisition is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm announced a merger or acquisition in the current fiscal year. Bankrupt Next Year is 
an indicator equal to 1 if the firm files for Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the next year (obtained from the 
UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database), and zero otherwise.  
 
Sample: All observations (N=8,533) 
No Fatality 
(N=2,836) 
Medium Fatality 
(N=4,864) 
Extreme Fatality 
(N=833) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Book Assets ($M) 30,863 119,903 18,148 57,533 36,787 141,925 39,562 132,615 
Market-to-Book ratio 1.84 1.41 1.81 1.24 1.86 1.52 1.88 1.30 
Book Leverage 0.25 0.18 0.26 0.18 0.26 0.19 0.24 0.18 
Cash-to-Assets 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.17 
I(Dividend Paying) 0.73 0.45 0.73 0.44 0.72 0.45 0.76 0.43 
ROA 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.19 
Stock Volatility (%) 38.60 22.09 38.44 20.83 39.01 23.15 36.81 19.67 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (%) 34.47 20.72 34.67 19.96 34.76 21.52 32.11 18.26 
CEO Age 56.85 7.01 56.96 6.91 56.83 7.15 56.59 6.49 
I(Announced Acquisition) 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.33 0.47 
I(Bankrupt Next Year) 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.08 <0.01 0.03 
Interest Expense/Debt 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 
 Table IV – CEO Early-Life Disaster Experience and Corporate Financial Policies 
This table reports OLS regression estimates for the relation between CEO disaster experience and corporate financial 
policies (dependent variables given in Column titles). The dependent variable in columns 1 through 3 is the book leverage. 
The dependent variable in columns 4 through 6 is the ratio of cash to assets. All models include fixed effects for the firm, 
year, CEO’s birth year, and state of CEO's birth. Columns 2 and 5 include third order polynomials for all continuous 
control variables in the model (not shown). Columns 3 and 6 include decile step functions for all continuous control 
variables in the model (not shown). All variables are as defined in Tables III. The standard set of controls include: natural 
log of book assets, market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility (fixed assets/book assets), dividend paying indicator, ROA, sales 
growth, CEO age and age squared, and CEO female indicator. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in 
parentheses. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable: Book Leverage Cash-to-Asset 
Medium Fatality Experience 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.030*** -0.012** -0.010** -0.010** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Extreme Fatality Experience -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.035*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.020***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Average Fatality Risk of County 0.003   -0.005   
 (0.007)   (0.004)   
(Average Fatality Risk of County)2 -0.000   0.001   
 (0.001)   (0.001)   
Ln(Book Assets) -0.010   -0.030***   
(0.009)   (0.006)   
Market-to-Book -0.011***   0.005*   
(0.002)   (0.002)   
Fixed Assets/Book Assets 0.040   -0.294***   
(0.061)   (0.034)   
Dividend Paying -0.023**   -0.001   
 (0.012)   (0.006)   
ROA -0.116***   0.032   
(0.026)   (0.022)   
Sales Growth 0.001   -0.005**   
(0.003)   (0.002)   
CEO Age -0.000   -0.006   
(0.007)   (0.005)   
CEO Age2 0.000   0.000*   
(0.000)   (0.000)   
CEO is Female 0.021   0.008   
 (0.019)   (0.012)   
Observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 
Adjusted R2 0.828 0.799 0.810 0.842 0.822 0.837 
3rd Order Polynomial Controls No Yes No No Yes No 
Decile Step Function Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Firm, Year, Birth Year, and State 
of Birth FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1    
 
 Table V – Sensitivity of Debt Issues, Equity Issues, and Retained Earnings to Financing Deficits by CEO Early-Life 
Disaster Experience 
This table reports OLS regression estimates for the sensitivity of net debt issues, net external equity issues, and changes in 
accumulated internal equity with respect to the firm net financing deficits, conditional on CEO disaster experience. The 
dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is net debt issues divided by lagged assets. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 
4 is net equity issues divided by lagged assets. The dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 is the change in retained earnings 
from the prior year divided by lagged assets. Net Debt Issues is defined as long-term debt issues minus long-term debt 
reduction and Net Equity Issues is defined as sale of common and preferred stock net of repurchases. Net Financing Deficit 
is defined as cash dividends plus net investment plus change in working capital minus cash flow after interest and taxes, 
normalized by beginning-of-the-year assets. The FD Control Variables are identical to those in Frank and Goyal (2003): 
changes in profitability (operating income before depreciation normalized by beginning of the year assets), in tangibility 
(property, plants, and equipment, normalized by beginning of the year assets), in the logarithm of sales and in Q (market 
value of assets over the book value of assets, where market value of assets is the book value of total assets plus market 
equity minus book equity). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable: Net Debt Issues   Lagged Assets 
Net Equity Issues  
Lagged Assets 
-1×ΔRetained Earnings 
Lagged Assets 
      
Net Financing Deficit (FD) 0.691***  0.332***  0.140***  
 (0.066)  (0.005)  (0.008)  
Medium Fatality Experience  -0.0018  -0.0019  -0.0064 
 (0.0022)  (0.0023)  (0.0057) 
Extreme Fatality Experience  0.0032  0.0042  -0.0169** 
 (0.0029)  (0.0028)  (0.0075) 
Medium Fatality Experience × FD  0.0495*  0.0055  -0.0307 
  (0.0266)  (0.0592)  (0.1081) 
Extreme Fatality Experience × FD  -0.1558**  -0.0735  0.0448** 
  (0.0729)  (0.0691)  (0.0228) 
       
Observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 
Adjusted R2 0.500 0.8814 0.442 0.779 0.311 0.790 
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects × FD No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
County Risk Controls, Birth Year  
and Birth State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Frank and Goyal (2003)  
Control Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Frank and Goyal (2003)  
Control Variables × FD No Yes No Yes No Yes 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1    
 
 Table VI – CEO Early-Life Disaster Experience and Credit Risk  
This table reports regression estimates for the relation between CEO disaster experience and interest expenses, credit 
ratings, or bankruptcy incidence (dependent variables given in Column titles). The sample is restricted to those firms with 
credit ratings in Columns 1 through 4. There are 27 unique credit level ratings in the sample, with the lowest being a ‘D’, 
and the highest being a ‘AAA’. Credit ratings are given a numerical score increasing by 1 for each increase in credit rating, 
with a 0 corresponding to a rating of ‘D’ and 26 corresponding to a rating of ‘AAA’. The dependent variable in Columns 1 
and 2 is the numerical credit rating score, where Column 1 reports ordered probit estimates and Column 2 reports OLS 
estimates. “Junk” rating is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm has a credit rating lower than BBB-, and 0 otherwise. “Not 
Rated” is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm does not have a credit rating, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors, clustered at the 
firm level, are reported in parentheses. Bankrupt Next Year is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm files for Chapter 7 or 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the next years (obtained from the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database), and 0 
otherwise. An analogous definition is employed for “Bankrupt Next 2 Years”. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
and reported in parentheses. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent Variable: 
Credit 
Rating: 
Ordered 
Probit 
Credit 
Rating: 
OLS 
“Junk” 
Rating 
“Junk” 
Rating 
Not 
Rated 
Bankrupt 
Next 
Year 
Bankrupt 
Next 2 
Years 
       
Medium Fatality Experience -0.365* -0.460** 0.071** 0.053* -0.021 0.009** 0.017** 
(0.214) (0.204) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.004) (0.008) 
Extreme Fatality Experience 0.774*** 0.586** -0.088* -0.051 -0.026 -0.015** -0.027** 
(0.267) (0.254) (0.048) (0.042) (0.041) (0.006) (0.011) 
        
Observations 4,114 4,114 4,114 4,114 8,553 8,553 8,553 
Adjusted R2 0.560 0.898 0.765 0.805 0.746 0.393 0.513 
Non-linear County Risk Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
All Controls from Table IV Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, Birth Year,  
and Birth State Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1        
 
   
 Table VII – CEO Early-Life Disaster Experience and Cost of Debt 
This table reports OLS regression estimates for the relation between CEO disaster experience and the cost of debt 
(dependent variables given in Column titles). The dependent variable in column 1 is the reported annual interest expense 
divided by total debt. The dependent variable in the columns 2-4 is the all in spread inclusive of all fees, in basis points, for 
bank loans, where each observation corresponds to a different loan deal. Loan controls, taken from Ivashina (2009), are the 
borrowing firm’s credit rating, whether the borrowing firm has a prior lending relationship with the lead bank, log-sales, 
log-assets, book leverage, ROA, log of the loan amount, loan maturity, collateral requirement, the presence of financial 
covenants and/or performance pricing, and the prime base rate. The dependent variable columns 5-7 is the spread over 
treasury yields for the firm’s newly issued bonds (bond yield-to-maturity less the yield on U.S. treasury of equivalent 
maturity) , where each observation corresponds to a unique bond issue. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent Variable: Int. Exp. Debt Bank Loan All-in Spread Bond Issue Spread over Treasury 
       
Medium Fatality Experience 0.016*** 18.974*** 21.108*** 16.852*** -6.292 -1.637 10.962 
(0.006) (6.729) (6.832) (5.830) (8.134) (7.811) (6.735) 
Extreme Fatality Experience -0.015* -20.602** -25.753*** -13.752 -29.851** -28.435** -13.981* 
(0.009) (7.404) (9.777) (8.730) (11.595) (12.334) (8.222) 
        
Observations 7,206 2,435 2,435 2,264 2,107 2,107 2,107 
Adjusted R2 0.517 0.290 0.481 0.596 0.291 0.482 0.792 
Non-linear County Risk Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
All Controls from Table IV Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Ivashina (2009) Controls N/A No No Yes No No Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Year, Birth Year,  
and Birth State Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Lead Lender Fixed Effects N/A Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1     
 
 Table VIII – CEO Early-Life Disaster Experience and Firm Acquisitiveness 
This table reports linear probability model regression estimates for the relation between CEO disaster experience and 
propensity to make acquisitions. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the firm announced an acquisition in 
the current year. All models include fixed effects for the firm, year, CEO’s birth year, and state of CEO's birth. Columns 2 
and 5 include third order polynomials for all continuous control variables in the model (not shown). Columns 3 and 6 
include decile step functions for all continuous control variables in the model (not shown). All variables are as defined in 
Tables III. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Announced Acquisition 
   
Medium Fatality Experience 0.061** 0.065** 0.068** 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) 
Extreme Fatality Experience -0.081** -0.079** -0.077** 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Average Fatality Risk of County 0.023   
 (0.027)   
(Average Fatality Risk of County)2 -0.003   
 (0.003)   
Ln(Book Assets) 0.050***   
(0.016)   
Market-to-Book -0.003   
(0.005)   
Book Leverage -0.098   
 (0.071)   
Fixed Assets/Book Assets -0.345***   
(0.118)   
I(Net Income < 0) -0.057***   
 (0.021)   
Dividend Paying 0.006   
 (0.029)   
ROA 0.025   
(0.045)   
Sales Growth 0.006   
 (0.012)   
CEO Age 0.009   
(0.018)   
CEO Age2 -0.000   
(0.000)   
CEO is Female -0.084   
(0.075)   
    
Observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 
Adjusted R2 0.394 0.397 0.404 
3rd Order Polynomial Controls No Yes No 
Decile Step Function Controls No No Yes 
Firm, Year, Birth Year, and State of 
Birth FE Yes Yes Yes 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
  
 Table IX – CEO Early-Life Disaster Experience and Acquisition Characteristics 
This table reports OLS regression estimates for the relation between CEO disaster experience and acquisition 
characteristics (dependent variables given in Column titles). Announcement CAR is calculated for the acquirer using a 
CAPM market model. All Stock Acquisition is an indicator equal to 1 for stock acquisitions, and 0 otherwise. Unrelated 
Acquisition is defined using the Fama-French 17 industry definitions. Columns 4 and 5 restrict the sample to diversifying 
and non-diversifying mergers, respectively. All models include fixed effects for (acquirer’s industry × year), CEO’s birth 
year and birth state. Controls for target public status, acquirer toehold ownership, friendly merger, and diversifying merger 
are also included but not shown for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: All Stock Acquisition 
Announcement 
CAR [-2,+2] 
Unrelated 
Acquisition 
Bidder-Target 
Correlation 
Sample: All Merger Announcements Diversifying Mergers 
Focused 
Mergers 
        
  
Medium Fatality Experience -0.074** -0.574* 0.079** 0.008 0.015 
(0.033) (0.332) (0.040) (0.032) (0.025) 
Extreme Fatality Experience 0.039 1.250** -0.039 0.057 0.050 
(0.067) (0.612) (0.073) (0.093) (0.041) 
Average Fatality Risk of County -0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.013) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
(Average Fatality Risk of County)2 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
All Stock Acquisition  -0.758**  0.028 0.067***
 (0.311)  (0.035) (0.017) 
Relative Size of Target 0.366*** -0.960 -0.084 0.169** 0.200***
(0.056) (0.690) (0.053) (0.069) (0.030) 
Acq. Ln(Book Assets) 0.024** -0.083 0.026* 0.044*** 0.058***
(0.011) (0.118) (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) 
Acq. M/B 0.036*** 0.292** -0.008 0.002 0.021***
(0.009) (0.116) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) 
Acq. Book Leverage -0.376*** 2.507** -0.204* -0.107 0.022 
(0.089) (0.985) (0.105) (0.116) (0.064) 
Acq. Cash/Assets -0.288** 1.158 -0.135 0.047 0.015 
(0.113) (1.307) (0.126) (0.191) (0.074) 
Acq. Stock Price Run-up [-250,-30] 0.001*** -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Acq. Stock Volatility [-250,-30] 0.004*** 0.013 -0.000 0.004** 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.019) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
CEO is Female 0.163 -2.883** 0.115 0.212 0.107* 
 (0.107) (1.251) (0.125) (0.130) (0.062) 
CEO Age -0.045 -0.460 -0.012 -0.017 -0.012 
 (0.035) (0.364) (0.034) (0.068) (0.018) 
CEO Age2 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 2,883 2,882 2,882 651 1,123 
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.221 0.200 0.842 0.762 
(Acquirer Industry × Year), Birth 
Year, and State of Birth Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Table X – CEO Early-Life Disaster Experience and Firm Equity Risk 
This table reports OLS regression estimates for the relation between CEO disaster experience and firm risk (dependent 
variables given in Column titles). All models include fixed effects for the firm, year, CEO’s birth year, and state of CEO's 
birth. Columns 2 and 5 include third order polynomials for all continuous control variables in the model (not shown). 
Columns 3 and 6 include decile step functions for all continuous control variables in the model (not shown). All variables 
are as defined in Tables III. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable: Stock Volatility Idiosyncratic Volatility 
      
Medium Fatality Experience 3.734*** 3.258*** 3.472*** 3.354*** 2.861*** 3.039*** 
(0.927) (0.912) (0.892) (0.847) (0.824) (0.809) 
Extreme Fatality Experience -3.613** -4.121*** -3.552*** -3.295** -3.836*** -3.306***
(1.437) (1.406) (1.361) (1.340) (1.296) (1.259) 
Average Fatality Risk of County -1.046   -1.047   
 (0.799)   (0.751)   
(Average Fatality Risk of County)2 0.036   0.037   
 (0.090)   (0.085)   
Ln(Book Assets) -2.600***   -3.342***   
(0.719)   (0.676)   
Market-to-Book 0.558**   0.051   
(0.240)   (0.230)   
Book Leverage 8.787**   10.507**   
 (4.112)   (4.097)   
Fixed Assets/Book Assets 12.416***   10.393**   
(4.387)   (4.347)   
Cash/Assets 12.653***   9.872***   
 (4.018)   (3.623)   
Dividend Paying -3.568**   -3.527***   
 (1.400)   (1.343)   
ROA -16.775***   -16.153***   
(3.306)   (3.089)   
Sales Growth 0.396   0.476   
 (0.563)   (0.627)   
CEO Age -0.050   0.019   
(0.776)   (0.700)   
CEO Age2 0.000   -0.001   
(0.007)   (0.006)   
CEO is Female 1.612   1.436   
(3.728)   (3.490)   
       
Observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 
Adjusted R2 0.737 0.771 0.752 0.718 0.766 0.735 
3rd Order Polynomial Controls No Yes No No Yes No 
Decile Step Function Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Firm, Year, Birth Year, and State 
of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1    
 Table XI – Placebo Test: Random Assignment of Disaster Experience across CEOs 
This table reports summary statistics of the regression estimates for the baseline models in Tables IV, VIII, and X 
(dependent variables given in Column titles), when we randomly assign a birth county to each CEO based on the observed 
distribution of CEO birth counties (with replacement). For each replication, we record the estimated coefficient and 
associated p-value. We repeat the procedure 500 times. We report the mean coefficient estimate for the main independent 
variables across the 500 replications. In brackets, we report the percentage of coefficient estimates that are positive and 
significant at the 5% level (% β>0 & α<5%) or negative and significant at the 5% level (% β>0 & α<5%). In 
parentheses, we report the percentage of coefficient estimates that have larger absolute value than and same sign as our 
baseline estimates from Tables IV, VIII, and X, and are significant at the 5% level (% |β|>|β*| & β×β*>0 & α<5%). The 
dependent variable is indicated in the Column titles. All standard controls from Tables IV, VIII, and X, fixed effects for 
firm, year, CEO birth year, and birth state are included but not shown for brevity.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Book Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
     
Mean β for Medium Fatality CEOs -0.006 0.004 -0.022 -0.774 -0.615 
[% β>0 & α≤5%; % β<0 & α≤5%] [2.0%; 2.2%] [3.0%; 2.2%] [2.6%; 3.0%] [1.4%; 3.4%] [1.4%; 2.6%] 
(% |β|>|β*| & β×β*>0 & α≤5%) (1.0%) (0.6%) (1.4%) (0.8%) (0.6%) 
Mean β for Extreme Fatality CEOs -0.005 0.003 0.011 -0.334 -0.222 
[% β>0 & α≤5%; % β<0 & α≤5%] [2.0%; 2.4%] [3.0%; 2.4%] [2.2%; 1.8%] [2.2%; 3.8%] [2.0%; 3.8%] 
(% |β|>|β*| & β×β*>0 & α≤5%) (1.2%) (1.4%) (0.4%) (1.6%) (1.0%) 
      
 
 
 
 
Table XII – Isolating the Effect of a Major Disaster between “Treated” and “Control” Birth 
Counties 
This table reports OLS regression estimates where the dependent variable is indicated in the Column title. 
The main dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 for the CEOs whose county of birth experienced a 
major disaster over the time period [t+5, t+15] years after the CEO's birth (“Treatment” group), and equal 
to 0 for those CEOs who were also within the age of 5 to 15 years old in unaffected counties within 100 
miles from the major disaster county (“Control” group). All standard controls from Tables IV, VIII, and 
IX, fixed effects for firm, year, CEO birth year, and birth state are included but not shown for brevity. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Book Leverage Cash Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
     
Major Disaster Experience -0.054*** 0.027*** -0.107*** -6.204*** -5.842*** 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.030) (1.251) (1.216) 
      
Observations 6,350 6,350 6,350 6,350 6,350 
Adjusted R2 0.830 0.854 0.417 0.736 0.716 
All Controls from Table IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm, Year, Birth Year,  
and State of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
 
 
Table XIII – Changes in Corporate Policies around Exogenous CEO Turnover Events 
This table reports mean changes in industry-adjusted book leverage, cash-to-asset ratio, probability of 
announcing an acquisition, and stock volatility of firms that experience exogenous CEO turnover events. 
The sample of exogenous CEO turnovers is from Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013). For each turnover event 
occurring in year t, the change in the firm’s industry-adjusted variable is calculated by subtracting the 
average industry-adjusted value of the variable over years [t-2,t] from the average industry-adjusted value 
over years [t+1,t+2]. The first Column reports the mean changes around exogenous CEO turnover events 
where the incoming CEO is more risk-tolerant than the old CEO, as measured by their respective early-life 
disaster experiences. These include turnovers where the CEOs change from No Fatality to Medium 
Fatality, Extreme Fatality to Medium Fatality, or Extreme Fatality to No Fatality. The second Column 
reports the mean changes around exogenous CEO turnover events where the incoming CEO is less risk-
tolerant than the old CEO. Column 3 reports the difference in mean changes of corporate policies between 
the two samples of exogenous CEO turnover events and Column 4 reports the corresponding t-statistic for 
the null hypothesis of no difference in means. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
New CEO Risk Tolerance  
Relative to Old CEO    
 
More Risk-
Tolerant 
(N=20) 
Less Risk- 
Tolerant 
(N=21) 
(1) minus (2) t-stat. 
ΔIndustry-adjusted Book Leverage 0.010 -0.011 0.021* 1.81 
ΔIndustry-adjusted Cash/Assets -0.015 0.001 -0.016 -1.04 
ΔIndustry-adjusted Acquisition Probability 0 .129* -0.091 0.220* 1.81 
ΔIndustry-adjusted Volatility (%) 1.432 -3.081*** 4.512** 2.15 
ΔIndustry-adjusted Idiosyncratic Volatility (%) 1.738 - 3.118*** 4.855** 2.70 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                            
1 Apple Inc. CEOs, Tim Cook and Steve Jobs, are examples of CEOs with widely differing childhood disaster 
experiences when growing up. Tim Cook, born in Mobile, Alabama in 1960, witnessed “only” 1.15 deaths across 57 
natural disaster events between the age 5-15. Steve Jobs, born in San Francisco, California in 1955, witnessed 31.6 
deaths across 39 natural disasters during the relevant early years of his life. 
2 This is consistent with recounts from survivors of recent tornado strikes – see Ganucheau and Fernandez, “Where 
Tornadoes Are a Known Danger, the One That Hits Home Still Stuns”, New York Times, April 30 2014, page A1.  
3 We thank Scott Yonker for graciously providing us with this data, which indicates that 75% of CEOs in our sample 
received their SSN in the same state as their birth county. 
4 In a related but different vein, other studies indicate that a CEO’s attitude toward risk affects decisions 
consistently, whether in a corporate setting or not. For example, Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar (2014) find that a 
conservative political affiliation is associated with a more conservative attitude in corporate decision-making. Cain 
and McKeon (2013) find that CEOs who are licensed small aircraft pilots have larger appetite for risk in the form of 
higher financial leverage, stock volatility, and propensity to engage in risky acquisitions. Roussanov and Savor 
(2013) find that unmarried CEOs also display larger propensities to take on risk. 
5 For example, Kelly (2013) suggests that emotions of disgust evolved to keep people from exposing themselves to 
germs (in rotting meat, for example) and were later co-opted to judge moral behavior.  
6 Cronqvist et al. (2014) find that even prenatal environmental factors such as testosterone exposure explain 
heterogeneity in risk taking later in life. 
7 Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute (2013). The Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United 
States, Version 12.0. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina. Available from http://www.sheldus.org  
8 The collection of disaster data for the pre-1960 period may suffer from an inherent coverage bias toward the most 
consequential events. To assess the extent of this bias, in Table IA.2 of the Internet Appendix, we report summary 
statistics of the county-disaster events for the pre- and post-1960 subsamples. While the number of all events and 
fatal events is lower in the pre-1960 than in the post-1960 period, the mean number of fatalities is considerably 
larger in the earlier period, supporting the idea that our pre-1960 data coverage is biased towards larger events. In 
Tables IA.3 and IA.4 of the Internet Appendix, we therefore repeat our main empirical tests to assess the robustness 
of our results to this potential bias in coverage across sub-periods. Overall, our main inferences are largely 
unaffected by the potential coverage bias. 
9 We define a disaster with “major fatalities” as one with at least 5 fatalities and fatalities scaled by county 
population greater than 0.05%, and a disaster with “major economic damage” as one with at least $1 million of 
property and crop damage (inflation-adjusted). Alternative choices of cutoffs do not significantly alter our results. 
10 Table IA.I in the Internet Appendix reports the results of this comparison. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
11 This assumption rests on the stationarity of disaster risk within the year of the CEO’s birth. The stationarity 
assumption is supported by findings in the meteorology literature (see, e.g., Elsner and Bossak (2001), Pielke, 
Wigley, and Green (2008)). 
12 The coefficient for the same test in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) is 0.75 (Table 2, Column 2). When Frank 
and Goyal (2003) restrict the sample to the top quartile of firms (which have a similar size to the firms in our 
sample), they obtain a coefficient of 0.753 for the 1971-1989 time period and 0.675 for 1990-1998 (Table 6, 
Columns 7 and 11). 
13 We obtain qualitatively similar results when we use monthly returns to calculate volatility, or examine systematic 
volatility instead. 
14 We are indebted to Scott Yonker for sharing the SSN-based data that allowed us to perform these robustness tests 
(see Yonker (2012) and Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2012) for details regarding this database). 
15 As noted earlier, this assumption rests on the stationarity of disaster risk.  
16 We thank Camelia Kuhnen for providing the data on her website at http://public.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/faculty/ 
kuhnenc/research/research.html. 
17 See also Lynn M. Highland and Robert L. Schuster, “Significant Landslide Events in the United States”, USGS 
graphic presentation by Margo L. Johnson (at http://landslides.usgs.gov/docs/faq/significantls_508.pdf), Engdahl 
and Villaseñor (2002) and C.A. Perry, “Significant Floods in the United States During the 20th Century - USGS 
Measures a Century of Floods”, USGS. 
18 See also Harpel, C. J., and J. W. Ewert, “Bibliography of literature from 1900-1997 pertaining to Holocene and 
fumarolic Pleistocene volcanoes of Alaska, Canada, and conterminous United States”, USGS. 
19 At http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazard/tsu_db.shtml.  
20 At http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/weather-events.html#hist and http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/. In 
addition, we used the 2011 NOAA Technical Memorandum by Eric S. Blake, Christopher W. Landsea, and Ethan J. 
Gibney. See also http://bangladeshtornadoes.org/UScases.html. 
21 In general, we were able to find historical records with relevant information for most disaster types in our dataset 
from GenDisasters at http://www3.gendisasters.com. 
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Table IA.I – Comparison of CEO-disaster sample with full Compustat and ExecuComp sample 
This table reports summary statistics for various firm and CEO characteristics. Panel A reports summary statistics for the sample of firm-year observations with 
available CEO birthplace and birthdate (“CEO-disaster sample”). Panel B reports summary statistics for the full set of Compustat and ExecuComp firms. M/B is 
defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at fiscal year-end. Fixed Assets is the sum of PP&E and investments divided by book 
assets. R&D is set to 0 if the value reported in Compustat is missing. ROA is defined as net income divided by lagged book assets. Stock volatility is the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns during the fiscal year. Total Compensation is item TDC2 in ExecuComp, and Delta and Vega are obtained from Lalitha Naveen’s 
website. Following Malmendier et. al. (2011), Depression Baby is an indicator variable equal to 1 for CEOs born between 1920 and 1929, inclusive, and 0 
otherwise. The last column reports the t-statistic for the difference in means between Panel A and Panel B.  
 
  
Panel A 
CEO-disaster Sample   
Panel B  
Full Compustat or ExecuComp Sample 
t-stat of 
Difference 
(Panel A – 
Panel B) 
 
N Mean  Std. Dev. 
 
N Mean  Std. Dev. 
   
Compustat Variables 
  
 
Book Assets 9,598 28,342.6 109,534.6 
 
189,889 4,401.3 48,474.1 38.65*** 
M/B 9,598 1.865 1.475 
 
189,889 1.839 9.047 0.24 
Book Leverage 9,598 0.254 0.182 
 
189,889 0.242 0.294 3.37*** 
Fixed Assets 9,598 0.300 0.245 
 
189,889 0.286 0.249 4.88*** 
Cash/Assets 9,598 0.112 0.147 
 
189,889 0.148 0.190 -16.38*** 
I(Dividend Paying) 9,598 0.726 0.446 
 
189,889 0.523 0.499 34.24*** 
R&D/Assets 9,598 0.089 1.666 
 
189,889 0.212 2.445 -10.06*** 
ROA 9,598 0.144 0.131 
 
189,889 0.092 0.717 6.26*** 
Stock Volatility (%) 9,598 35.05 22.72 
 
189,889 0.475 0.290 -36.53*** 
 
 
 
Execucomp Variables 
  
 
Total Compensation 9,598 7,220.9 19,160.3 
 
26,199 4,727.8 12,743.7 13.11*** 
Delta 9,598 2,450.5 17,963.6 
 
26,199 1,161.1 10,829.7 7.66*** 
Vega 9,598 211.8 403.8 
 
26,199 123.7 265.8 22.11*** 
Age 9,598 56.8 7.0 
 
26,199 55.5 7.4 12.45*** 
I(Depression Baby) 9,598 0.038 0.19   26,199 0.029 0.168 3.68*** 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
     
  
Table IA.II – Comparison of Pre-1960 and Post-1960 Disaster Samples 
 
This table reports the number of disaster events and average fatalities per event by disaster type and time period. 
The first two columns report summary statistics for all disasters while the last two columns restrict the sample to 
disasters with at least 1 fatality. 
 
  ALL EVENTS   FATAL EVENTS 
  Pre-1960   Pre-1960 
 
N  
Events 
Mean  
Fatalities  
N  
Events 
Mean  
Fatalities 
Earthquake 615 5.58 
 
229 14.98 
Hurricane 1,476 15.24 
 
1,191 18.89 
Severe Weather 4,383 1.42 
 
458 13.62 
Volcano 3 1.33 
 
3 1.33 
Weather 50 11.30 
 
50 11.30 
Fire 2,249 4.50   739 13.68 
 
Post-1960 
 
Post-1960 
 
N  
Events 
Mean  
Fatalities  
N  
Events 
Mean  
Fatalities 
Earthquake 191 2.06 
 
29 13.60 
Hurricane 8,189 0.12 
 
1,662 0.58 
Severe Weather 233,547 0.03 
 
6,690 1.13 
Volcano 6 0.17 
 
1 1.00 
Weather 404,787 0.05 
 
27,366 0.70 
Fire 2,423 2.07   272 18.48 
  
  
Table IA.III – Robustness: CEO Birthdate Subsamples Analysis  
This table reports OLS regression estimates for the baseline models in Tables IV, VIII, and X (dependent 
variables given in Column titles), when we use alternative subsamples of CEOs based on their birth year. All 
standard controls from Tables IV, VIII, and X, fixed effects for firm, year, birth year, and birth state are included 
but not shown for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Panels A, B, 
and C restrict our main sample to the set of CEOs born before 1955, before 1950, and before 1945, respectively. 
 
Panel A: CEOs born before 1955 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Medium Fatality 
0.027*** -0.015*** 0.043 3.764*** 3.394*** 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.028) (0.909) (0.832) 
Extreme Fatality 
-0.040*** 0.017*** -0.122*** -3.190** -2.616** 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.038) (1.280) (1.214) 
Observations 7,607 7,607 7,607 7,607 7,607 
Adjusted R
2
 0.833 0.847 0.400 0.749 0.733 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
 
Panel B: CEOs born before 1950 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Medium Fatality 
0.016** -0.022*** 0.039 4.572*** 4.541*** 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.035) (1.071) (1.050) 
Extreme Fatality 
-0.044*** 0.009 -0.106** -3.582** -2.799* 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.048) (1.483) (1.506) 
Observations 6,490 6,490 6,490 6,490 6,490 
Adjusted R
2
 0.833 0.848 0.417 0.763 0.748 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
 
Panel C: CEOs born before 1945 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Medium Fatality 
-0.002 -0.030*** 0.149*** 4.914*** 4.906*** 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.055) (1.459) (1.400) 
Extreme Fatality 
-0.077*** -0.020 0.031 -2.688 -2.969 
(0.020) (0.013) (0.082) (2.208) (2.194) 
Observations 4,774 4,774 4,774 4,774 4,774 
Adjusted R
2
 0.840 0.867 0.433 0.797 0.786 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
  
Table IA.IV – Robustness: CEO Disaster Experience Thresholds by Birthdate Subsample 
This table reports OLS regression estimates for the baseline models in Tables IV, VIII, and X (dependent 
variables given in Column titles), when we use alternative methods to set CEO disaster experience thresholds. All 
standard controls from Tables IV, VIII, and X, fixed effects for firm, year, birth year, and birth state are included 
but not shown for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. Each panel 
classifies CEOs into three disaster experience categories using the distribution of fatal disasters from a different 
sample period depending on the year of CEO birth (indicated in the panel title). For example, in Panel A, CEOs 
born prior to 1945 are classified based on the distribution of fatalities from 1900-1959 while those born after 
1945 are classified using the distribution of fatalities from 1960-2010. 
 
Panel A: Threshold based on 1900-1959 data for pre-1945 births and 1960-2010 data for post-1945 births 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Medium Fatality 
0.034*** -0.011*** 0.043* 3.933*** 3.511*** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.024) (0.737) (0.667) 
Extreme Fatality 
-0.030*** 0.014*** -0.073** -3.197*** -2.806*** 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.031) (1.008) (0.929) 
Observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 
Adjusted R
2
 0.828 0.842 0.399 0.736 0.718 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
 
 
Panel B: Threshold based on 1900-1959 data for pre-1955 births and 1960-2010 data for post-1955 births 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Medium Fatality 
0.037*** -0.013*** 0.048** 4.280*** 3.802*** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.024) (0.759) (0.688) 
Extreme Fatality 
-0.023*** 0.013** -0.057** -2.502*** -2.140** 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.029) (0.949) (0.876) 
Observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 
Adjusted R
2
 0.828 0.843 0.401 0.735 0.717 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
 
 
Panel C: Threshold based on 1900-1959 data only for all birth years 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Medium Fatality 
0.039*** -0.013*** 0.050** 4.408*** 3.900*** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.024) (0.759) (0.688) 
Extreme Fatality 
-0.022*** 0.011** -0.056* -2.241** -1.868** 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.029) (0.943) (0.870) 
Observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 
Adjusted R
2
 0.828 0.842 0.399 0.736 0.718 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
  
  
 
Panel D: Threshold based on 1960-2010 data only for all birth years 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Medium Fatality 
0.032*** -0.012*** 0.049** 3.416*** 3.079*** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.023) (0.752) (0.684) 
Extreme Fatality 
-0.036*** 0.028*** -0.165*** -2.477** -2.359** 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.034) (1.240) (1.157) 
Observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 
Adjusted R
2
 0.828 0.842 0.399 0.736 0.718 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
  
Table IA.V – Alternative Specifications of CEO Disaster Experience 
This table reports OLS regression estimates for the baseline models in Tables IV, VIII, and X (dependent 
variables given in Column titles), when we use alternative measures of CEO disaster experience. In Panel A, 
‘Extreme Fatality’ experience is defined as the top 15% of the distribution (as opposed to top 10% in Tables 3 
and 4), while in Panel B the same is defined as the top 5% of the distribution. In Panel C, the categorical variable 
for CEO disaster experience is replaced with a continuous measure of fatalities from natural disasters normalized 
by the county population and its square. Panels D and E use categorical variables for CEO disaster experience, 
defined using property damage (Panel D) and crop damage (Panel F), both inflation adjusted and normalized by 
county GNP. Panel F uses categorical variables for CEO disaster experience, defined using the actual minus 
expected proportion of fatalities per capita. All standard controls from Tables IV, VIII, and X, fixed effects for 
firm, year, birth year, and birth state are included but not shown for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level and reported in parentheses. 
Panel A: Top 15% Cutoff 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Medium Fatality 
0.039*** -0.016*** 0.052** 4.316*** 3.892*** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.024) (0.761) (0.690) 
Top 15% Extreme Fatality 
-0.025*** 0.012** -0.058** -2.688*** -2.417*** 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.029) (0.989) (0.910) 
Observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 
Adjusted R
2
 0.827 0.841 0.398 0.737 0.719 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
 
Panel B: Top 5% Cutoff 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Medium Fatality 
0.030*** -0.013*** 0.044* 3.015*** 2.741*** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.023) (0.752) (0.679) 
Top 5% Extreme Fatality 
-0.049*** 0.035*** -0.195*** -1.379 -1.489 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.039) (1.367) (1.295) 
Observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 
Adjusted R
2
 0.827 0.842 0.401 0.734 0.716 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
 
Panel C: Continuous Measure of Fatalities 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Fatalities/County Population 
0.058** -0.034*** 0.168** 4.817** 3.949* 
(0.024) (0.012) (0.067) (2.322) (2.125) 
(Fatalities/County Population)
2 -0.061*** 0.038*** -0.196*** -4.941*** -4.289*** 
(0.015) (0.007) (0.040) (1.379) (1.280) 
Observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 
Adjusted R
2
 0.826 0.842 0.401 0.734 0.716 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
  
 
Panel D: Economic Damages (Property and Crop Damage) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Medium Econ. Damage 
0.039*** -0.024*** 0.036* 3.524*** 3.211*** 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.020) (0.884) (0.834) 
Extreme Econ. Damage 
 -0.027** 0.017*** -0.167*** -2.574** -2.389** 
(0.011) (0.005) (0.035) (1.233) (1.198) 
Observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 
Adjusted R
2
 0.826 0.842 0.400 0.736 0.717 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
 
Panel E: Actual-Expected Fatality Experience (Overall Average Fatality Risk) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Medium Unexpected Fatality 
Experience 
0.028*** -0.017*** 0.063*** 3.749*** 3.397*** 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.022) (0.726) (0.666) 
Extreme Unexpected Fatality 
Experience
 
-0.040*** 0.026*** -0.141*** -3.026*** -2.846** 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.031) (1.153) (1.109) 
Observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 
Adjusted R
2
 0.826 0.842 0.401 0.736 0.718 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
 
  
  
Table IA.VI - Effect of CEO Early-Life Disaster Experience over Years [Birth+5, Birth+10] 
This table reports OLS regression estimates for the baseline models in Tables IV, VIII, and X (dependent 
variables given in Column titles), when CEO disaster experience is measured over a 5-year window for years 
[t+5,t+10] after birth. All standard controls from Tables IV, VIII, and X, fixed effects for firm, year, birth year, 
and birth state are included but not shown for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported 
in parentheses. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Medium Fatality 5to10 
0.025*** -0.006* 0.054*** 2.471*** 2.151*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.021) (0.692) (0.647) 
Extreme Fatality 5to10 
-0.032*** 0.024*** -0.106*** -2.837** -2.523** 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.029) (1.130) (1.082) 
Observations 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 8,533 
Adjusted R
2
 0.828 0.843 0.401 0.735 0.717 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
 
  
  
Table IA.VII – Two-Points-in-Time Measurement of CEO Early-Life State Domicile 
This table reports OLS regression estimates for the baseline models in Tables IV, VIII, and X (dependent 
variables given in Column titles), when we include only CEOs whose state of birth and state where the first 
Social Security number was obtained (usually around age 15) is the same. All standard controls from Tables IV, 
VIII, and X, fixed effects for firm, year, birth year, and birth state are included but not shown for brevity. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Medium Fatality 
0.041*** -0.017*** 0.031** 2.511** 2.408** 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.014) (1.113) (1.122) 
Extreme Fatality 
-0.029** 0.027*** -0.151*** -2.892** -2.450* 
(0.014) (0.007) (0.045) (1.414) (1.335) 
      
Observations 5,740 5,740 5,740 5,740 5,740 
Adjusted R
2
 0.836 0.855 0.424 0.739 0.721 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
 
  
  
Table IA.VIII – One Observation per Firm-CEO 
This table reports OLS regression estimates for the baseline models in Tables IV, VIII, and X (dependent 
variables given in Column titles), when all dependent and independent variables are averaged across all annual 
observations for every CEO-firm pair. All standard controls from Tables IV, VIII, and X, fixed effects for Fama-
French 49 industry, birth year, and birth state are included but not shown for brevity. Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Book 
Leverage 
Cash 
Holdings 
Announced 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Volatility 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
 
     
Medium Fatality 
0.030** -0.017** 0.050* 5.776*** 5.128*** 
(0.013) (0.007) (0.028) (2.030) (1.911) 
Extreme Fatality 
-0.034* 0.019* -0.078* -0.958 -1.015 
(0.018) (0.010) (0.044) (3.030) (2.858) 
Observations 1,894 1,894 1,894 1,894 1,894 
Adjusted R
2
 0.388 0.531 0.288 0.540 0.554 
*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1 
 
  
 
